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When Drills and Pipelines Cross Indigenous Lands
in the Americas
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez*
From the Missouri River, passing through the Sonora Desert, all the
way down to the Amazon Forest and the Andean Mountains, drills and
pipelines are crossing over indigenous lands. In an energy-thirsty
continent, there is no land left to spare, not even tribal land. Many of these
energy infrastructure projects involve international investments that are
protected by treaties and enforced by arbitral tribunals. At the same time,
tribal communities have an internationally recognized right to receive
prior and informed consultation before they are affected by projects of this
nature. The Article focuses on the clash of rights between energy
extraction companies investing abroad, and persons in indigenous
communities whose lands are being condemned or disturbed to facilitate
these companies’ extraction activities.
As the Article explains,
international treaties force the State to protect both these interests and
set up norms, backed by international judicial interpretations, that
prioritize the economic benefits of resource extraction in the name of
public benefits. Consequently, when the rights of investors and
communities clash, governments almost categorically side with the
interests of foreign investors, at the sacrifice of the interests of local
communities. The Article sees this course as endorsing a societal view that
elevates economic considerations over noneconomic considerations and
advocates a more pluralistic societal view that sees noneconomic
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considerations on par with (and at times, of superior importance to)
economic considerations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, Sempra Energy announced that it had been
awarded a natural gas transportation contract worth $108 million in
northern Mexico.1 The project was one of the earliest results of the
opening of Mexican energy markets to foreign investment.2 The
pipeline was to start in Arizona, stretch down 833 kilometers cutting
through the Sonora Desert, and provide U.S. natural gas to a combinedcycle power generation plant of the Mexican state-owned company in
Chihuahua.3 The project exemplified the continuing integration of U.S.
and Mexican energy markets. For this, and many other projects,
Mexico’s Minister of Energy, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, received the 2015
“Minister of the Year” award.4
A year later, two members of the Loma de Bacum Yaqui indigenous
community in Sonora were murdered, and three hundred others were
up in arms protesting against the construction of a nine-mile stretch of
the pipeline over their lands.5 The Loma de Bacum Yaqui community
complained that the government did not respect their rights to be
consulted before approving the pipeline project and that the crossing of
the infrastructure through their lands was a violation of their ancestral
way of life.6 The community further rejected the company’s monetary
compensation for their losses and the employment offers to its
1 Dennis Fandrich & Mark Iden, Sempra Energy Secures Gas Pipeline Transportation
Contract in Chihuahua, Mexico, PIPELINE TECH. J. (2015), https://www.pipelinejournal.net/news/sempra-energy-secures-gas-pipeline-transportation-contractchihuahua-mexico.
2 See generally Guillermo Jose Garcia Sanchez, The Fine Print of the Mexican Energy
Reform, in MEXICO´S NEW ENERGY MODEL (2018) (describing the importance and legal
framework of the Mexican energy reform of 2013).
3 Fandrich & Iden, supra note 1.
4 Mexico Secretary of Energy, El Secretario de Energía, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell,
recibió premio a Ministro del Año 2015 [Secretary of Energy, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell,
received the 2015 Minister of the Year award], GOBIERNO DE MÉXICO (Sep. 17, 2015),
https://www.gob.mx/sener/prensa/el-secretario-de-energia-pedro-joaquin-coldwellrecibio-premio-a-ministro-del-ano-2015.
5 Yaqui Communities Clash Over Pipeline, MEX. NEWS DAILY (Oct. 22, 2016),
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/yaqui-communities-clash-over-pipeline.
6 The report explains how the activist of the loma de Baum community rejected the
monetary compensation offered by the company for being an example of a model that
seeks to integrate communities into an economic system that disrespects their ways of
life and rights. The public policies adopted by the State displaces the communities from
their ancestral lands, forces them to work for the transnational companies and attempts
against their culture. Gema Villela Valenzuela, Yaquis denuncian amenazas de Segob por
gasoducto, CIMACNOTICIAS (2016), https://cimacnoticias.com.mx/noticia/yaquisdenuncian-amenazas-de-segob-por-gasoducto (last visited Mar 3, 2021).
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members.7 By the spring of 2019, the pipeline had been sabotaged
several times, and no agreement was in sight.8 Even though the
pipelines were either idle or incomplete and not delivering gas, the
Mexican government had to pay investors the regular rate because the
delays and circumstances were beyond the foreign investors’ control.9
Under the force majeure contract terms, circumstances out of Sempra’s
control included sabotages, challenges to the consultation processes
with indigenous people, land title issues, and local authorities’
permits.10 In the summer of 2019, the bill piled up to around three
billion dollars, and Mexico’s new administration announced that it
would pursue an arbitration proceeding against the companies in an
effort to redefine the contract’s terms.11 The announcement brought
down Sempra’s shares by 1.1% and its Mexican subsidiary’s shares by
4%.12 After months of negotiation between the state-owned company
and Sempra, the State signed an agreement to lower the bill but
promised to continue with the project.13 The Yaquis were left with no
other option but to continue their protest.14 Unfortunately, the Yaquis’
story is not unique to Mexico but rather a phenomenon present in the
Americas and connected to a deeper energy integration process.
Energy integration in the northern hemisphere is now possible
because of Mexico’s 2012 decision to open up its sector to private
parties and the renegotiation of the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), now replaced by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA).15 The old NAFTA framework lacked any
7

Id.
Rob Nikolewski, Sempra’s Subsidiary in Mexico Looks to Put Sabotaged Pipeline
Back into Service, MORNING CALL (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.mcall.com/sd-fi-sempramexico-pipeline-20190304-story.html.
9 Sergio Chapa, Abbot to AMLO: Wrap Up Pipeline Probe and Get Natural Gas Moving
South, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
energy/article/Abbott-to-AMLO-Wrap-up-pipeline-probe-and-get-14281518.php.
10 Id.
11 Dave Graham, Mexico’s President Defiant in Row with Canada Over Pipeline
Contract, REUTERS (June 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-ienovacanada/mexicos-president-defiant-in-row-with-canada-over-pipeline-contractsidUSKCN1TS1XF.
12 Id.
13 Mexico Reaches Deal with Private Gas Pipeline Firms, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 27,
2019), https://apnews.com/d389467505724d84b6a9a5f85f8de72f (last visited Sep
20, 2019).
14 Id.
15 Corey Paul, USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade, S&P
GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/market
intelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/56067737 (describing how the
USMCA and the opening of Mexico’s sector in 2013 allow the energy markets of U.S. and
Mexico to integrate further); Shawn Donnan, Andrew Mayeda, Jenny Leonard & Jeremy
8
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protection for U.S. or Canadian companies making deals with Mexico in
the production, transportation, and exploitation of hydrocarbons.16 The
state-owned companies, Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), reserved authority over energy
production and hydrocarbon development, respectively.17 Moreover,
the construction of energy infrastructure and the integration of the
region are part of a broader conversation involving strategic
investments in Central America in order to boost their economies and
reduce migration flows.18 An energy integration strategy that begins in
the Tar Sands of Canada and continues all the way down to the
Amazonian region is a key component to rebuilding governance in the
Americas.19
All of these discussions surrounding energy integration are
happening while the three nations are debating the way energy
investments affect vulnerable communities.20 In the case of Mexico, one
only needs to remember that the Zapatista indigenous rebellion started
the day NAFTA entered into force, and the exclusion of their rights in the
treaty was one of the elements that triggered the uprising.21 In the case
of the U.S., the Keystone XL and the North Dakota pipeline conflicts with
the Sioux tribes are recent reminders of the tensions that emerge among

C.F. Lin, Trump’s ‘Historic’ Trade Deal: How Different is it From Nafta?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-nafta-vs-usmca.
16 Guillermo J Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, in THE
CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES: A LEGAL CULTURE ANALYSIS 27 (Tina Soliman Hunter et
al. eds., 2020).
17 Id. at 15, 17, 19, 27.
18 PETER MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL
AMERICA: POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 6–7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44
812.pdf; Albert Wynn, A Reliable Power Grid in Central America May Resolve Migrant
Crisis INSIDESOURCES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/a-reliablepower-grid-in-central-america-may-resolve-migrant-crisis; Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC Presents the Central America-Mexico
Comprehensive Development Plan to the Government of Honduras, ECLAC (July 25, 2019),
https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/eclac-presents-central-america-mexicocomprehensive-development-plan-government [hereinafter Caribbean].
19 MEYER, supra note 18 at 7; Wynn, supra note 18; Caribbean, supra note 18. For the
impact on U.S.-Canada energy integration, see Ben Cahill, U.S.-Canada Energy Trade in
2019, CSIS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-canada-energy-trade2019.
20 See generally S. James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty
to Consult with Indigenous People, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 435 (2017); Robert J. Miller,
Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to Confer with American Indian
Governments, 91 N. D. L. REV. 37 (2015).
21 Paul Imison, How NAFTA Explains the Two Mexicos, ATLANTIC (2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/nafta-mexico-trumptrade/540906 (last visited Feb 12, 2021).
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companies, authorities, and communities.22 The same can be said of
indigenous communities’ anti-fracking opposition to the “Idle No More”
movement in Canada, during which they were violently confronted by
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in New Brunswick.23 According to
data from the Environmental Justice Atlas, ninety active social conflicts
involving fossil fuels and climate justice/energy conflicts have been
reported in the three countries,24 representing approximately 25
percent of the total active social conflicts in the three nations
combined.25
Government negotiators often treat free trade, energy, and
indigenous rights as separate fields, but in practice, they interact with
and affect each other. International legal scholars typically overlook this
overlap as well.26 International business transactions courses and
academic articles rarely include the study of community rights.27 On the
other hand, human rights literature usually fails to include the study of
22

For a description of this conflict and the ongoing legal battles regarding the
pipeline see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are
Transforming Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 497, 514–15 (2017); James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars:
Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119,
137–39 (2018) [hereinafter Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars]; James W. Coleman,
Pipelines & Power-lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263,
281–83 (2019).
23 Brenna Bhandar, The First Nations of Canada Are Still Waiting for the Colonial Era
to End, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
oct/21/canada-colonial-mentality-first-nations.
24 Leah Temper, Daniela del Bene & Joan Martinez-Alier, Mapping the Frontiers and
Front Lines of Global Environmental Justice: the EJAtlas, 22 J. POLIT. ECOL. 255 (2015);
Mapping Environmental Justice, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ATLAS, https://ejatlas.org/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019). I used the Atlas per country available on the website and
categorized those conflicts as Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy. As of February
22, 2021, the Atlas identifies 24 conflicts for Mexico, 45 for the U.S., and 21 for Canada.
See Countries, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ATLAS, https://ejatlas.org/country.
25 Id. The total number of social conflicts reported by country are the following:
United States 152, Mexico 139, Canada 62. Id.
26 Sergio Puig, International Indigenous Economic Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243,
1247 (2019).
27 Take for example the classical introductory book on International Business
Transactions from Ralph Folsom et al, where there is a full section on the protection of
foreign investments, regulatory takings, and international dispute resolution
mechanisms, but there is no mention of the companies’ obligation to respect human
rights, indigenous rights, the environment, etc. RALPH FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON
& JOHN SPANGOLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL (8th ed. 2009).
Another example can be found in Rudolph Dolzer and Christopher Schreuer’s classical
book, “Principles of International Investment Law,” where there is no mention of the
companies’ relations with communities or human rights norms, but there is a full section
of political risk insurance and the principles that protect foreign direct investment
against interference with their assets. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2008).
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international companies and their investment rights.28 The investment
system and the human rights regime are traditionally studied as
separate silos, where specialized courts develop principles and
standards to bring consistency and systematicity to each regime.29
Scholars and adjudicators might borrow from other fields, but they do
not see them as belonging to the same sphere.30 As stated by Professor
Sergio Puig: “Except for the occasional shared conference or workshop,
these fields are typically separated into distinct, often insular, epistemic
communities.”31 The global efforts that have tried to attend this
disparity focus on the duties that nonstate actors, such as international
companies, have to respect human rights.32 Indigenous people’s
advocates focus on delineating the extent to which government
responsibilities can be extended to powerful actors such as
transnational corporations.33 In the same vein, investment law scholars
who are interested in addressing the social implications of foreign
investment advocate for the inclusion of amicus briefs by affected
communities in the proceedings and for the inclusion of social corporate
responsibility principles in investment treaties.34

28 MARIA VICTORIA CABRERA ORMAZA, THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSULTATION WITH INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN THE ILO (1st ed. 2017); Jason Tockman, Eliding Consent in Extractivist States:
Bolivia, Canada, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 22 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 325 (2018); Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent:
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within International Law, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
54 (2011); Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements
and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 121 (2011).
29 Puig, supra note 26, at 1251.
30 See generally Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional
Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L LAW 361 (2018) (describing
how different advocates for the reform of investment law approach the process from
three different angles: efficiency (law and economics scholars), fairness (Rawlsianoriented scholars), and interstate relations, power, and conflicts (realist-oriented
scholars.)).
31 Puig, supra note 26, at 1251. Another example of scholars creating a bridge to
connect fields can be found in Mariana Hernandez Crespo G., A New Chapter in Natural
Resource-Seeking Investment Using Shared Decisions System Design (SDSD) to Strengthen
Investor-State and Community Relationships, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 551, 564–65,
580, 585 (2017).
32 U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
U.N. Docs. HR/PUB/11/04; James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
of Indigenous People on Extractive Industries Operating Within or Near Indigenous
Territories, U.N. Docs. A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/IPeoples/SR/A-HRC-18-35_en.pdf.
33 U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
supra note 32.
34 FAROUK EL-HOSSENY, CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: STATUS AND
PROSPECTS 251–54 (2018) (offering a comprehensive study of all the efforts by the
system to include civil society in the arbitral proceedings).
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This Article follows the invitation of this new scholarship to reflect
on whether energy projects, investor rights, and community rights
should be analyzed as belonging to the same field.35 It invites the reader
to see investment law, energy law, and community rights as different
views of the same cathedral. But instead of shedding light on the arcs of
duties that connect government and companies in a globalized
economy, it takes us to the underground crypt of the cathedral—to the
foundations of the State’s right to extract natural resources. The
development of energy projects depends on who owns the resources
necessary to produce and transport energy, and on what types of
relationships emerge from the “bundle of rights” created by property
law. This Article takes the view that the three fields, investment, human
rights, and sovereign rights over natural resources, give normative
meaning to the way international law deals with property conflicts
surrounding energy development projects.
The following Parts propose a novel way to view the cathedral’s
foundations. Part II describes the canons of the international legal fields
that impact natural resource production on indigenous land: sovereign
rights over natural resources, the human rights regime, and the
investment regime. Sections A–D review how each field studies and
defines the protection of the right to property from third-party
interference and how the regimes resolve the clash of rights. Part III
looks at representative cases where the regimes clash leaving the State
trapped in the middle. Finally, Part IV defines how a paradigm in the
energy academia, energy justice, creates ways of understanding the
value of natural resources and the interests of the actors involved in
their development.

35 LOCAL ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Ljiljana
Biukovic & Pitman B. Potter eds., 2017); Puig, supra note 26, at 1244.

GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2021 5:43 PM

2021] DRILLS AND PIPELINES CROSS INDIGENOUS LANDS

1129

II. THREE COLLIDING REGIMES: THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF EXTRACTION, THE
DUTY TO CONSULT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, AND THE PROTECTION AND SECURITY
OF FOREIGN INVESTORS PROPERTY
For decades, the energy industry and disenfranchised communities
have had a complicated relationship.36 Nevertheless, the social damage
that energy infrastructure brings to communities was not
internationally recognized until the 1990s.37 The 1994 executions of
Ogoni activists in Nigeria to protect Royal Dutch/Shell’s operations
changed the international perception of the industry.38 Soon after the
Nigerian outcry, other cases began to see the light of public scrutiny: BP
Amoco and Occidental Petroleum’s operations’ connection to abusive
military forces in conflict zones; Unocal and Total’s Myanmar pipeline
projects in partnership with government forces who condoned forced
labor; Mobil Oil’s natural gas fields operations in the Indonesian
province of Aceh and the forced disappearance of villagers; and Enron’s
confabulations with local police to suppress local opposition to the
construction of a power plant south of Bombay, India.39 The conflicts
have always been there, but in past decades they have translated into a
rights conflict narrative that tends to be resolved through a cost-benefit
analysis.
What aggravates the clash of rights is the fact that there are two
competing false narratives. On the one hand, there is always the
promise from governments and companies that the investments made
by the extractive industries will generate some trickle-down
development in the communities.40 As such, the economic benefits to

36 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbjorn Eide, Helge Ole Bergesen, & Pia
Rudolfon Goyer eds., 2000); Ivonne Cruz, Adrian Duhalt & Pamela Lizette Cruz, Social
Conflicts and Infrastructure Projects in Mexico, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INST. FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 1, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/e7aec681/bi-report-0621
19-mex-socialconflict.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
37 Geoffrey Chandler, The Responsibility of Oil Companies, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL
INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 5; see also Arvind Ganesan, Human Rights, the Energy Industry,
and the Relationship with Home Governments, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY, supra
note 36.
38 Ganesan, supra note 37, at 47.
39 Id. at 47–48; Chandler, supra note 37, at 10–14.
40 See generally Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional
Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L LAW 361, 371–73 (2018)
(describing how there are three competing goals in the reform of investment treaties,
fairness, efficiency and peace, but that they ignore assessing adequately the tradeoffs of
each alternative); for the role by lawyers and experts in creating institutional
frameworks supporting development goals based on economic theory but ignoring the
real impacts on society see David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choice, and
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M
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the communities should outweigh the negative effects of the
infrastructure built on their land. On the other hand, there is the
perception furthered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that
indigenous and local communities’ right of previous and informed
consultation is a right to approve or reject the projects that are being
planned by the government.41 Both are false narratives that fail to
resolve the tensions that emerge when governments approve the
concessions, licenses, and permits; infrastructure is built; communities
revolt against the investor; and the State is forced to choose between
protecting the investment or the communities. The State decision is
informed partly by political considerations but also by the international
consequences attached to treaties where the government pledged to
protect both of them.
As the following Sections will show, the way international law
recognizes the rights of the State to extract its natural resources and
how international investment and human rights regimes deal with
breaches of treaties aggravates the tension. The three regimes have
ultimately monetized rights violations in a way that leaves communities
on the wrong side of the government’s cost-benefit analysis. This
monetization arises from the fact that the foundations of the State’s right
to extract natural resources rely on a classical liberal and utilitarian
view of property rights that overemphasizes the value of economic
welfare, as opposed to recognizing community-based interest and
multi-layered relationships that arise out of the existence of property
rights.42 The liberal and utilitarian foundation and its focus on economic
welfare is then replicated in the indigenous and investment regimes.
A. States’ Rights Over Natural Resources and their Liberal and
Utilitarian Foundations
The purpose of this Section is to explain how the liberal and
utilitarian foundations of the State’s rights to extract its natural
resources set the stage for the clash of rights between indigenous
communities and investors. The right to extract a hydrocarbon or to
Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The
Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYD. L. REV. 5, 26 (2005).
41 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Puig, supra note 26; Miller, supra note
20.
42 Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3–4 (Charles Geisler
& Gail Daneker eds., 2000) [hereinafter Singer, Property and Social Relations]; see also
Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of Property Rights, or
How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Singer, Indian
Title].
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build infrastructure to transport energy products in the name of
consumers, the State, or in general for a “public benefit” sits at the center
of the conflicts that emerge. These questions are not new for property
law scholars. There is a rich and longstanding debate among property
law scholars on how the law deals with the tensions among individual
property rights, the State’s powers to infringe on them for public
benefits, and the State’s use of private parties to achieve the alleged
social goals.43 This Article does not intend to exhaust the debate but
rather to show how these unresolved tensions are also present in the
international legal regimes that regulate State exploitation of mineral
resources and the protection of property of investors and indigenous
people.
The unresolved debate in domestic property law reemerges at the
international level because the State’s right to extract resources has a
liberal and utilitarian foundation. The way international law regulates
the rights of the sovereign to extract resources in their territory
aggravates the conflict that emerges when the governments also pledge
in separate instruments to protect indigenous communities’ land and
foreign investors’ property from third-party interference. In many
energy-related projects, these two pledges collide, and the State relies
43 See e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and
Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW IN THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 427
(G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996) (“[P]roperty implicates the very core
issues of politics: distributive justice and the allocation of power.”); Singer, Property and
Social Relations, supra note 42; Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After JKelo v. City of
New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 491, 497 (2006) (“Rather than advancing the goals of efficiency and justice,
modern eminent domain practices in the area of economic development are tainted by
the abuse of existing property owners (particularly, but not exclusively, in the form of
undercompensation for taken property), capture by special interests, and inefficiency.”);
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (1999) (“In a vast and otherwise contentious literature, whether
judicial opinions or scholarly books and articles, there appears to be a virtual consensus
that the purposes of just compensation are essentially two[:] . . . ‘efficiency’ and
‘justice[]’”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (“[A]n ‘efficient’
process is one which maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satisfaction, in
society, and not all satisfaction is material.”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (2018) (describing how the modern regulatory takings
disputes unmask the competing conceptions of property: property-as-liberty, propertyas-investment, and property-as-society); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and
Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006)
(“When owners prove unwilling or unable to sort out disagreements about . . . spillover
effects on their own, the state [has] to make decisions about which spillover effects
owners must tolerate and which spillover-creating actions they may not take . . . .”);
Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363,
370 (2010) (“No societally recognized and enforced property right, which is
‘normatively neutral,’ actually exists.”).
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on a cost-benefit analysis and the monetization of the property rights to
resolve the tension. The international regimes downplay the “public
benefit” of the social, cultural, and spiritual connection that indigenous
people have with their land and overemphasize the economic “benefits”
that building energy infrastructure through private parties provides to
the State.
International treaties that regulate a State’s sovereign rights to
extract its natural resources rely on a conception of property rights in
which the emphasis is given to the land’s economic value as a means to
achieve development.44 I argue that this conception is based on a liberal
and utilitarian conception of property rights. It is liberal and utilitarian
because it serves the purpose of protecting individual freedom,
translated as State sovereignty at the international level, and also
promotes economic investment in the land, downplaying other
community-based values.45 Under the liberal view, individuals are
considered absolute within their own “castle” only subject to
intervention in the name of a greater common good.46 International law
treats State sovereignty over its territory and resources in a similar way
as the liberal view treats individual property rights. Both property
views assume the existence of “permanent rights of absolute control”
through the existence of the power to exclude others and “the full power
to transfer those rights completely or partially on such terms as the
owner may choose.”47
The international treaties that regulate the rights of the State over
their natural resources also have a utilitarian view because they
conceive natural resources mainly as “tools” to advance economic
44

See generally NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW PERSPECTIVES (Celine Tan and Julio Faundez eds., 2017); see also Singer,
Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 3–4.
45 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912. This is what Professor Mulvaney characterizes
the traditional conceptions of property “a libertarian view sees property as creating a
sphere of individual freedom and control (property-as-liberty); a pecuniary view sees
property as a tool of economic investment (property-as-investment).” Id. Professor
Mulvaney also identifies a progressive view that “sees property as serving a whole host
of evolving social goals including, but not limited to, the aforementioned goals of
promoting freedom and encouraging economic investment (property-as-society).” Id.
46 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5. The traditional view of
property rights has its genesis in John Locke’s philosophy on the “state of nature.” JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 30–32, 37 (Thomas Hollis ed., 1764) (ebook).
Under his philosophy, property has the main purpose of cultivating and improvement.
Mere possession cannot be the purpose of the title. Following Locke’s views on the
nature or property, it is easy to conclude that indigenous possession that does not seek
to generate economic benefits, as it is not transferable as a property right. Under the
law of nature, indigenous property is rather a type of usufruct or habitation.
47 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5.
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development for the greater good.48 Little attention is given to the fact
that natural resources might serve other social values, such as cultural
or religious heritage.49 This is particularly true for social values that do
not conform to the heritage of the majority of the population.
Conversely, indigenous people conceive their land and natural
resources primarily through social, cultural, and religious relations.
These natural resources are not means to an end; they are the essence
of their culture.
A liberal and utilitarian approach to property is not without
contradictions. On the one hand, the liberal view affirms title owners’
absolute right of exclusion, and on the other, the utilitarian foundation
regulating the property of natural resources is preoccupied with the
task of transforming the environment to create an agricultural and
urban industrial economy.50 The State encourages economic actors to
tame the “wilderness” and transform it for development benefit.51 In
that process, regulation and property law are constructed and
reconstructed to drive economic transformation forward, even above
the right of exclusion of titleholders.52 Except for in a few circumstances,
preservation is discouraged and rules of landownership are shaped to
incentivize economic growth.53
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of 1963 is a clear example of how
the absolute right of exclusion and the economic drive over natural
resources materialized internationally.54 The resolution, adopted by a
vote of eighty-seven to two with twelve countries abstaining, recognizes
the “inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural
wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests and in
respect for the economic independence of the States.”55 This widely
accepted international instrument affirms further that “natural wealth
and resources must be exercised in the interests of their national

48

Celine Tan & Julio Faundez, Introduction, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT supra note 44 at 1–2; Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability
Symposium: The Challenge of Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL, L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
49 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5. In the classical approach,
the owner is identifiable “by formal title rather than by informal relations or moral
claims.” Id.
50 Sax, supra note 48, at 4.
51 Id. at 5.
52 Id. at 6.
53 Id.
54 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, 1803 GAOR 15 (1962).
55 Id.

GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

1134

4/21/2021 5:43 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1121

development and the well-being of the people.”56 The text of the
declaration employs terms such as “exploration, development and
disposition,” and uses “foreign capital” to achieve these goals only
subject to the “rules and conditions” set up by the different nations.57 In
other words, the resolution recognizes the absolute right of the State to
exclude others, be them foreign governments or private entities, and
exploit the natural resources in its territory for economic development.
It is the international version of a classical and utilitarian vision of
property rights, which puts exploitation over conservation first and
treats property owners as absolute only subject to the limits of an
undefined public good.
Here is where the paradox of the property regime in the context of
indigenous rights emerges. For indigenous communities to exercise
property rights against others, they must downplay their property’s
spiritual, religious, and social value. Instead of promoting the inclusion
of the “others” into the benefits of their culture, communities are forced
to argue for the exclusion of others. Once the title is recognized, the
communities can exclude other private owners, but they are then
subject to the limits of the State’s public interests.58 In the name of
“public benefits,” lands are expropriated, and communities are
relocated. For the sake of benefiting loosely defined social progress,
individual or indigenous property rights cannot get in the way of the
“social progressive view” of property rights that trumps a titleholder’s
rights of exclusion.59 It is the State’s expansion over property rights in
the name of public interest-oriented projects or public interest
regulation.60
This “social” view of the value of property tends to outbalance the
consequences of affecting the titleholder’s individual freedom against
the economic benefits that a particular project will bring into society.
This restriction on the right of exclusion exists particularly in countries
where mineral rights located in the same land belong to the
governments, and those governments require the minerals’ extraction

56

Id.
Id.
58 Singer, Indian Title, supra note 42, at 27.
59 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912; see also Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of
Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19,
42–43, 60 (David M Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing how the “social”
progressive view fits under the second globalization of legal thought that sought to
dismantle an over emphasis on the laissez fair, individual rights, private law, and private
interests over the economy).
60 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912.
57
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to fund social programs.61 The government agencies may then choose
to negotiate with private third parties over the exploitation of the
resources and award concessions, licenses, or other contractual
schemes for that purpose.62 Companies become an “arm” of the State;
they develop the resources on behalf of the nation in exchange for
participation in production or profits.63
If the State protected indigenous peoples’ communal property
interest over other economic and social interests, i.e., energy
consumers, the paradox would not emerge. On the contrary, indigenous
communities could rely on State intervention for the protection of their
communal life.64 But the State tends to weigh the different interests and
values protected by property rights, and in that cost-benefit analysis,
energy infrastructure projects seem to trump communal life.65 To be
clear, I do not argue that contemporary legal systems completely
disregard community values. For example, property law doctrines
recognize public prescriptive easements and public nuisance. Liberal
and utilitarian conceptions of property law, however, allow societies to
normatively deny that indigenous culture provides the same public
benefits as national historical landmarks or environmentally sensitive
lands.66 Few would argue that the economic benefits of building
invasive energy infrastructure in a historical site such as Gettysburg’s
battlefield, the Arlington National Cemetery, or the National Cathedral
in Mexico City outweigh the loss to society. We do, however, justify
drilling on indigenous sacred lands in forests or the construction of

61

Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16, at 216–17;
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach to International Investment Law, the
Hydrocarbons Industry, and Its Relation to Domestic Institutions, 57 HARV. INT. LAW J.
477–80, 490 (2016).
62 See generally NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 44;
Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16; Garcia Sanchez,
A Critical Approach, supra note 61 at 477–80.
63 Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16, at 219–20.
64 See Singer, Indian Title, supra note 42, at 30. Joseph Singer’s proposal to solve the
paradox is to limit the eminent domain powers of the State. While the state in general
is free to take fee simple property for public use with just compensation, what could
protect the communities is a title that allows the State to obtain tribal lands only with
tribal consent.
65 See id. at 32. Singer’s Johnson case interpretation has a dual protection: “[T]he
United States has a right of first refusal to tribal lands. That means that the tribe cannot
transfer fee simple title to anyone other than the United States and that the United States
cannot acquire tribal title without the voluntary consent of the tribe.” Id.
66 Contemporary legal systems, particularly in the U.S., do recognize that there are
properties that are immune from eminent domain, but the question is whether
indigenous lands should also be awarded the same treatment.
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pipelines on tribal burial grounds as providing substantive energy
benefits for the State or consumers.
B. The International Rights of Indigenous People and the Tensions
with States’ Sovereign Rights over Natural Resources
International treaties and resolutions on indigenous people’s
rights have mitigated the way the State exercises its sovereignty over
their land, culture, and social relations.67 There is a rich literature
discussing the importance and effectiveness of the indigenous-rights
treaties, conventions, and resolutions.68 The literature tends to focus on
the processes of implementing the rights of indigenous people to receive
prior, free, and informed consultation for any development project in
their land.69 This Article, however, moves the debate to the perspective
of the State that has a sovereign right to exploit natural resources in the
name of progress. A liberal and utilitarian view of property law that
diminishes the value of indigenous cultural, spiritual, and social
connection to resources influences the international norms that
regulate the State’s sovereign rights to exploit them. The liberal and
utilitarian view is so prevalent that it is replicated in other international
instruments that converge around energy projects.
For example, the same international conventions that recognize
indigenous communities’ rights and important cultural value to
humanity affirm that, when it comes to natural resources and the State’s
right to extract them, the only protection left to indigenous communities
is the right to be consulted. These conventions also reaffirm the
monetization of the property by requiring the State to integrate them in
the economic benefits of the extraction. When placed in a balance, the
social, cultural, and spiritual connections to the land are forcefully
converted into economic benefits.

67 See generally PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford
University Press, 1st ed. 2015); Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; James Anaya, Promotion
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34, (July 15, 2009) (explaining
the origins and scope of the duty of states to consult, as written by the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
People) [hereinafter Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights];.
68 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, supra note 67; MACKLEM, supra note 67.
69 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, supra note 67; MACKLEM, supra note 67.
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The right to consultation is enshrined in international instruments,
mainly the United Nations General Assembly Declaration of Indigenous
Rights of 2007 (“UN Indigenous Rights Declaration”)70 and Convention
169 of the International Labor Organization of 1989 (“ILO Convention
169”).71 The preamble of the ILO Convention 169 recognizes “the
aspirations of [indigenous and tribal] peoples to exercise control over
their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within
the framework of the States in which they live.”72 The preamble also
recognizes “the distinctive contributions of indigenous and tribal
peoples to the cultural diversity and social and ecological harmony of
humankind and to international co-operation and understanding.”73
The Convention then recognizes the responsibility of the State to
“respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of
the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or
territories.”74 There is a clear recognition that indigenous people have
a unique relationship with the land and natural resources. The ILO
Convention 169, however, also recognizes that the State can exploit the
same resources, and that international law does not recognize a right to
oppose such a development.75 Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169
provides:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or
sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to
lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures
through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests
would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such
resources pertaining to their lands.76
The right to be consulted and the duty of the State to evaluate the
impact do not translate to a right to veto or oppose the project. This is
even clearer when the same article adds that the “peoples concerned
70 A majority of 144 States voted in favor, 4 voted against (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States), and 11 states abstained (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and
Ukraine). See G.A. Res. 61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter UN Indigenous Rights
Declaration].
71 United Nations, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), June 27,
1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169].
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Anaya & Puig, supra note 20, at 435–36.
76 ILO Convention 169, supra note 71, at art. 15 (emphasis added).

GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

1138

4/21/2021 5:43 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1121

shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and
shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of such activities.”77
The same principle is recognized in Article 32 of the UN Indigenous
Rights Declaration, where it provides:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples . . . in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands and territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation
of mineral, water, or other resources.78
In case the project proceeds, “[s]tates shall provide effective
mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental,
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.”79 Additionally, Article 28
of the UN Indigenous Rights Declaration sets the “right to redress, by
means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair
and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources . . .
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without
their free, prior and informed consent.”80
Hence, the system both recognizes the spiritual, social, and
religious connection of the indigenous people to the land and the State’s
rights to exploit the mineral resources when needed, subject to “just, fair
and equitable compensation.”81 Again, indigenous property is treated
as any other right being affected by a public purpose is treated, and the
definition of what is to be considered a public benefit depends on
government officials and their normative commitments. When push
comes to shove, the economic benefits of contracting with private
parties to develop natural resources on behalf of the State supersedes
the interests of indigenous communities. At that point, the State’s only
duty is to mitigate the damages and compensate the communities with
some economic benefit.

77
78
79
80
81

Id.
UN Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 70, at art. 32.
Id.
UN Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 70, at art. 28. (emphasis added)
See id.
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1. Indigenous Communities’ Rights of Consultation and the
Inter-American System of Human Rights
As explained further below, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), sitting in San Jose, Costa Rica, has extensively
developed the rights of indigenous people. Yet its jurisprudence, to my
view, has not addressed the issue in a way that fully dissuades State
preference for a solution based on a cost-benefit analysis.
The IACtHR cases involving indigenous communities can be
divided into three categories.82 The first involves aggressions against
the communities that range from murders of activists to massacres of
entire villages.83 Most of these cases happened in contexts of internal
civil wars (Guatemala), military operations against drug cartels

82

There is one case involving electoral processes in which an indigenous activist
wanted to run for local government but was denied access to the ballot, since he did not
belong to any political party. Since this is only one case in the docket, I do not treat it as
a category in itself. See YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23, 2005).
83 See Acosta y Otros v. Nicaragua [Acosta et al. v. Nicaragua], Preliminary Objections,
Background, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334 (Mar. 25, 2017)
(involving the murder of an activist involved in the defense of the ancestral lands of his
community); Miembros de la Aldea Chichupac y comunidades vecinas del Municipio de
Rabinal v. Guatemala [Members of the Village of Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys. of
Rabinal v. Guatemala], Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328 (Nov. 30, 2016) (involving the massacre of 32 indigenous people
in 1982 during the civil war); Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190 (Nov. 26, 2008) (involving the forced disappearance
of an indigenous activist and her newborn daughter during the civil war in Guatemala
in 1990); Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 (May 25, 2010) (involving the forced
disappearance of an indigenous local municipal authority during the civil war in
Guatemala in 1990); Gudiel Álvarez et al (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262 (Nov. 20, 2012) (involving
several massacres and extrajudicial killings of indigenous communities between 1980
and 1982 during the Guatemalan Civil War); Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007) (involving the
extrajudicial killing of the leader of an indigenous community by the Colombian army in
1988); Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010) (involving the sexual assault of
an indigenous woman by the Mexican army during anti-drug trafficking operations by
the military in Guerrero); Fernández Ortega et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010)
(involving the sexual assault of an indigenous woman by the Mexican army during antidrug trafficking operations by the military in Guerrero); Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124
(June 15, 2005) (involving the massacre and forced displacement of an afro-indigenous
community in Suriname in 1986); Masacre Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Merits, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105 (April 29, 2004) (involving a military operation to eradicate
guerilla insurgents and the communities supporting them).
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(Mexico), or guerilla activities (Colombia).84 Some of the aggressions
forced the communities to abandon their ancestral lands, and they have
not recovered them since.85 Nevertheless, the main claim in the cases
had to do with acts of aggression and the lack of effective judicial
proceedings to investigate human rights violations claims. In these
cases, the IACtHR has mainly focused on the lack of judicial response to
adequately prosecute human rights violations against communities.86
This focus is partly because government officers were involved, and
partly that indigenous communities’ claims are not taken seriously in
these jurisdictions. Consequently, the communities’ right to effective
judicial protection was ignored.
The second group of cases involves the lack of State administrative
and/or judicial proceedings to take care of property or title claims from
indigenous communities.87 In the majority of these cases, third parties
displaced the communities due to the lack of titles regarding their

84

See Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334, ¶ 33; Members of the Village of
Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328, ¶ 60; Tiu Tojin,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶ 40; Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212,
¶ 27; Gudiel Álvarez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262, ¶ 33; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ⁋ 138; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 3,
Masacre Plan de Sanchez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, ¶¶ 42.5–42.6.
85 See, e.g., Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334; Members of the Village of
Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328; Tiu Tojin, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190; Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212; Gudiel
Álvarez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Escué-Zapata, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 262; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216; Fernández Ortega, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124.
86 See Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334; Members of the Village of Chichupac
and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328; Tiu Tojin, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 190; Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212; Gudiel Álvarez, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Escué-Zapata, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Rosendo
Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216; Fernández Ortega, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 215; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124.
87 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty v.
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 102, 103,
215, 217, 225 (June 17, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 123–24, 127, 137–38 (Aug.
31, 2001); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 1, 91, 107, 110, 115–16, 194 (Nov. 28,
2007); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 171 (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Sarayaku Merits and
Reparations]; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 209; Xákmok Kásek
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 214, ¶¶ 154, 210, 281 (Aug. 24, 2010); Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and
the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶¶ 152, 157–58, 160, 166 (Oct.
14, 2014).
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ancestral lands.88 In these decisions, the IACtHR has ordered the States
to create a system that processes the communities’ land claims and is
tailored according to their social, cultural, and language barriers, as well
as regional necessities.89 The development of these groups of cases
reinforces the idea that indigenous communities have a right to assert
full title rights in their lands, and for that purpose, there must be a
process for them to acquire title.90
Finally, the third category of cases involves the right of indigenous
communities to be consulted regarding any development project (e.g., a
hydroelectric dam in Panama) or investment made in their lands or that
could have an impact in their territories (e.g., oil and gas fields in
Ecuador, mining concessions in Suriname, lumber extraction in
Nicaragua).91 Naturally, some of these cases also connect with the first
and second categories because they involve aggression from local
authorities when the communities protest against the development
projects or when the right of consultation has not been respected due to
the impossibility of determining the communities’ title to the land. 92
These types of cases are relevant for the future of energy-related
projects in the region. The way the IACtHR interprets the rights of
indigenous people to have their ancestral rights recognized and to be
consulted is relevant for States’ decision-making processes, in which
they must balance the different interests and goals involved in energy
projects.
According to the IACtHR, the State’s first responsibility is to
establish an effective proceeding domestically that allows the
communities a “delimitation, demarcation, and titling of indigenous
community lands.”93 Then, the IACtHR connects this proceeding to the
right to receive protection from the State regarding property rights.94
88

Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 at ¶¶ 154, 310.
Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 at ¶ 63; Tiu Tojin,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190 at ¶ 96; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 at ¶ 270; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 at ¶ 184;
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶ 264.
90 See Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 at ¶¶ 172, 174–75, 194c.
91 Id. at ¶ 194d; Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶¶ 227, 301.
92 See, e.g., Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334 (involving an activist who was
murdered after protesting and initiating judicial and administrative proceedings for the
recognition of ancestral lands now being occupied by Greek and American real-estate
developers); Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87 (finding the Sarayaku
community blocked the entrance to the oil fields and, on several occasions, attacked
workers of the oil company; in exchange, the State used the police, which, on several
occasions, used excessive force).
93 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 at ¶ 137.
94 Id at ¶¶ 142–55.
89
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Article 21 of the American Convention of Human Rights (“American
Convention”) follows the liberal and utilitarian tenets of property rights
by declaring that “no one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social
interests, and in the cases and according to the form established by
law.”95 Moreover, it expands the liberal and utilitarian view that the
essence of property rights is to exclude others from interfering in the
owners’ enjoyment by declaring that “everyone has the right to the use
and enjoyment of its property.”96 The only exception is legislation that
“may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interests of society.”97
Consequently, the Convention recognizes that there is no absolute right
of exclusion or immune property rights from the use of eminent domain
for public purposes.98 It is from this traditional premise of the liberal
and utilitarian view of property rights that the IACtHR has developed its
jurisprudence.
According to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence, and just like any other
property right recognized by the American Convention, indigenous
people and tribal people must receive guarantees of effective and equal
exercise of their rights over the territories that they have traditionally
occupied.99 Briefly, occupation of tribal lands must be equalized to a
private property right through an effective proceeding established by
the State.100 And as such, just like any other private right, it must be
protected by the State from third-party interference, subject only to
limits imposed by the State for the benefit of the public interest. The
textual protection provided by the American Convention is thus the
protection of a property right in the most liberal way possible.

95 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of
San José, Costa Rica,” 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 150 (Nov. 22, 1969) [hereinafter American
Convention].
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Hence, the Convention does not recognize the social, cultural and religious values
that emerge from property rights and that cannot be replaced by commentary
compensations. The basis of property rights in the Convention is the exclusion of others
first, and then a few exceptions for public purposes, including the payment of just
compensations for reasons of public interests. This right follows very closely the
drafting of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend V, § 1 (“No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
99 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 91 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶ 171.
100 Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 at ¶ 116.
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The liberal and utilitarian conceptions of property rights contrast
with indigenous communities’ expectations that international treaties
provide them with the right to halt the investment if they do not want to
give their consent.101 Specifically, false expectations are created after
obtaining title to their land, and then communities revolt against the
companies, blocking access to the energy-related projects and, in some
instances, exercising violence against the operators and local
authorities in the region.102 Out of the revolt against the projects,
another international duty by the State is breached: the right of foreign
investors to receive full protection and security. As the following
Section explains, the two international obligations collide in the
development of energy infrastructure projects.
C. The Duty to Protect Foreign Investors from Third-Party
Interference
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or sections of Free Trade
Agreements, such as Chapter XI of NAFTA, give special protection rights
to foreign investors against government intervention.103 These treaties
give foreign investors the right to bring international claims against
States in arbitral tribunals when they are being treated unfairly, in a
discriminatory way, or when they have not received full protection and
security.104 In case the State does not respect these rights and is found
in breach of its treaty obligations, companies can receive compensation
for their losses.105 In other words, these treaties also reinforce the
liberal and utilitarian conception of private property.
Hence, whether there is a clash between the rights of consultation
and of foreign investment due to the false narratives described above,
the State has no option but to weigh the consequences of siding with one
or the other protected interest. And this comes down to a monetary
calculation. In some cases, the government might even end up paying
the foreign investors and the communities. Paradoxically, the State ends
up compensating indigenous communities because it did not protect
101

See infra Sections III.A and III.B for examples.
Id.
103 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), there are 2,336 BITS in force and 323 Treaties with Investment Provisions
in force globally. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements (last visited Mar 3, 2021); North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 ILM
605, (1993).
104 Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach, supra note 61, at 481–83.
105 Id. at 518–25.
102
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them against the interference with their lands, while also paying the
international company for not protecting it against the indigenous
communities’ unrest affecting their investment plans.106
1. International Investment Treaties and the Rights to
Receive Full Protection and Security of Foreign Direct
Investments
The full protection and security standard is one of the oldest
obligations in international investment law. Along with the fair and
equitable principle, this standard has been present in international
treaties since the time of the signing of the Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) treaties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.107
As an example of the type of clause included in those treaties, Article 3
of the FCN treaty between Brunei and the United States of 1850 states
that “[c]itizens of the United States of America shall as far as lies within
[Brunei’s] power, within his dominions, enjoy full and complete
protection and security for themselves and for any property which they
may acquire . . . .”108
In these early international instruments, the standard was included
alongside the fair and equitable treatment principle. The combination
of both principles, together with the national treatment standard, was
considered to compose the “minimum standard of treatment of aliens”
prescribed by public international law.109 To grant investors full
protection and security, in essence, means that the State is obligated to
take active measures to protect international investment from adverse
effects. The State can inflict these adverse effects as a general policy, by
its organs, or through third parties, such as indigenous communities.110

106

See discussion of Burlington Resources infra at Part II.C.2.
Take, for example, the FCN treaty between Mexico and the Dominican Republic of
1890 or the FCN between Venezuela and Italy of 1881, both of which include the same
standard of full protection and security. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Dom. Rep.-Mex., art. III, Mar. 29, 1890; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, It.-Venez., art. IV, Sept. 20, 1862.
108 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Brunei-U.S., June 23,
1850, 10 Stat. 909; Treaty Series 33, quoted in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability,
¶ 161 (July 30, 2010) (emphasis added).
109 RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGARET STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 61 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 203–04 (1988); Robert R.
Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 AM. J.
INT’L L. 83, 92–96 (1951).
110 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 150–52.
107
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International investment tribunals have confirmed such an
approach in several cases.111 The traditional interpretation of the
standard calls for a pure physical protection and an obligation of due
diligence from acts originated from State organs or third parties.112 This
first generation was distinctive and essential for this Article because it
involved cases of social unrest and situations of armed conflict that
directly affected the investors’ interests in the host State.113 Moreover,
111 International Tribunals and Courts have faced different disputes where these
harms have been alleged. These decisions are not binding precedents, but they have
interpretive value that has been ignored by both tribunals and academia. For a
discussion on how international investment tribunals use precedents to build a
“common law” that is not recognized in treaties see generally CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007).
112 Elettronica Sicula, SpA (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 108 (July 20).
ELSI is one of the first recorded resolutions on the full protection and security standard
rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On that occasion, an American
company located in the city of Palermo was requisitioned by the local government and
taken over by its workers. The United States government presented a claim against Italy
for the violation of the U.S.-Italy FCN treaty. The ICJ in its decision stated that the
standard did not warrant protection in all circumstances. In the words of the ICJ, “[T]he
provision of ‘constant protection and security’ cannot be construed as the giving of a
warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed.” Id.
113 Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,
¶¶ 45–50 (June 27, 1990). The ELSI interpretation was confirmed by the AAPL tribunal.
On that occasion, as a consequence of counter-insurgency operations, the government’s
military forces destroyed the company’s complex. The claimant argued that the
existence of the words “enjoy” and “full” made the treaty’s standard one of strict liability
that required the State to “achieve a result.” The tribunal rejected this claim by arguing
that the words’ inclusion did not elevate the standard to another type of liability distinct
from the one construed by the traditional view of due diligence; see also Am. Mfg. &
Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶¶ 6.05–6.10,
(Feb. 21, 1997). After the AAPL’s interpretation was reaffirmed by the AMT tribunal.
The AMT resolved a dispute between an American investor and the government of Zaire.
In this case, another American company brought claims arising out of episodes of looting
in which soldiers of the State armed forces destroyed, damaged or stole the investors’
property. The looting happened in the context of constant riots and insurrection in the
early 1990s in Zaire. The tribunal decided that the obligations “incumbent upon Zaire
is an obligation of vigilance.” Id. As such, the investor had the right to receive “all
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of its
investment.” Id. The tribunal even recognized that the State could not “invoke its own
legislation to detract from any such obligation.” Id. On that occasion, the Republic of
Zaire argued that it did not afford a different treatment to AMT in comparison to the one
given to its own nationals and to foreign companies in the context of riots and
insurrections. Furthermore, the government argued that national legislation had
exonerated the State from any liability. The tribunal further concluded that the State
must take all necessary actions to prevent the incident regardless of how it acted
regarding its own population or other States. In this sense, the AMT tribunal seems to
have elevated the standard to a stricter one. A well-administered State in the same
circumstances could have been found equally guilty of the omission. The tribunal
required additional protection for this investor than that afforded to its own nationals
or other parties. See also Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
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these cases included instances where the arbitrators had to discuss the
role of governments in preventing actions taken by third parties and
compare them to similar government acts taken to protect other actors,
such as local populations.114 Nevertheless, as time has passed and
ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 82–85 (Dec. 8, 2000). The tribunal in Wena found that in light of
the seizure of the hotel’s premises by its workers union (EHC), there was “substantial
evidence that . . . Egypt was aware of EHC’s intentions to seize the hotels and took no
actions to prevent EHC from doing so.” Id. Moreover, once the seizures occurred, both
the police and the Ministry of Tourism took no immediate action to restore the hotels
promptly to Wena’s control. Id. Finally, Egypt never imposed substantial sanctions on
EHC or its senior officials, suggesting Egypt’s approval of EHC’s actions. Id. As such, the
tribunal found a violation of the standard in the lack of actions from State action
notwithstanding the absence of any evidence that it fostered the intervention directly.
Id.
114 Wena Hotels Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 82–85; Tecnicas
Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/02, Award, ¶¶ 175–77 (May 29, 2003). TECMED is another case in which
uncontrolled social protests against the investor were alleged as constituting a violation
of the full protection and security standard. The TECMED tribunal had to decide
whether the lack of action from the State to stop social demonstrations and disturbances
at the investor’s premises amounted to a violation of the standard. Id. The tribunal
found that there was no evidence that the State contributed, encouraged or fostered the
events that affected the investment. Id. In order for the tribunal to find the State guilty
of violating the standard, it was essential to find evidence “supporting the allegation that
the Mexican authorities, whether municipal, State, or federal, have not reacted
reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the
direct action movements.” Id. See also Nobel Ventures Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 164–66 (Oct. 12, 2005). The same situation of social unrest
presented itself in the case between the company Nobel Ventures Inc. and the
government of Romania. After several labor protests in the city of Resita, the premises
of the company were repeatedly occupied and damaged. Due to the similarities between
the ELSI case and the case at hand, the tribunal used the ICJ criteria and dismissed the
claims presented by the investor. Id. Some tribunals have even been asked to decide
whether harassment from State officials could be considered as a violation of the
standard. See Eureko BV v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 236–37 (Aug. 19, 2005)
(involving dispute that rested in the harassment inflicted by Polish State negotiators
upon Netherlands based company’s representatives). In Eureko, the tribunal found that,
although there was no evidence that the State as a whole was the instigator, if the
“actions were to be repeated and sustained, it may be that the responsibility of the
Government of Poland would be incurred by a failure to prevent them.” Id. More recent
decisions have involved situations in which robbery and personal attacks have been
committed. See GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16,
Award, ¶¶ 239–67 (March 31, 2011) (confronting three actions that the claimant
considered as a violation of the standard: unpunished theft of GEA’s products, the lack
of response from Ukraine in a shooting of GEA’s representative, and the
misrepresentations in certain negotiations of an individual from the Ukrainian partner
of GEA). In its resolution, the tribunal found that the failure to present criminal
complaints at the time of the robberies proved that GEA did not consider them as grave
enough to request an intervention from the State. Id. Regarding the second allegation,
the tribunal found that there were some investigations initiated by the State to find the
responsible individual of the shooting, and as such there was nothing else that the State
could be expected to do. Id. Finally, the tribunals found that the claimant failed to prove
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international investment tribunals have begun to interpret it, the
original essence of the standard has evolved to a point that it can even
be confused with other standards.115
The new interpretation says that the protection must include the
legal framework in force at the time that the investment was made.116
The argument is twofold: some investments cannot receive physical
protection, like contractual rights, and the only way to protect certain
investments is through legal instruments. As such, the standard has
evolved to resemble one related to the investor’s legitimate
expectations at the time of investing.117 The danger of that tendency is
that it can almost make the standard equal to a stabilization clause. It is
up to the tribunals to decide which approach to take. For this Article,
however, as the analysis below shows, the principle continues to entail
the protection of physical infrastructure of foreign investors from thirdparty interference.

that Ukraine was responsible or that it could have initiated some actions to prevent the
misrepresentations of the Ukrainian company representative. Id.
115 This very early origin and its interpretation as part of the minimum standard has
made the principle a difficult element to distinguish from the other standards,
particularly the fair and equitable treatment standard. Many tribunals, when analyzing
fair and equitable treatment, have been forced to enter into a discussion of full
protection and security, and it seems at some points that the essence of the principles
get mixed. This mixture has led some scholars to believe that in today’s modern bilateral
treaties, the standard cannot be envisaged independently. According to Margarete
Stevens and Rudolph Dolzer, the principle was included in “less detailed” treaties in the
first half of the XIX century and then was passed on into today’s bilateral investment
treaties without analyzing its scope or meaning according to the new investment
realities. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 109, at 60–61; see also Vandevelde, supra note
109, at 204; Wilson, supra note 109, at 92–96.
116 Total SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability
(Dec., 27 2010), ¶ 121–22 (arguing that “a claim to stability can be based on the
inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing a defined
framework for future operations. This is the case for regimes, which are applicable to
long-term investments and operations, and/or providing for ‘fall backs’ or contingent
rights in case the relevant framework would be changes in unforeseen circumstances or
in case certain listed events materialize. . . . This is the case for capital intensive and
long-term investment and operations of utilities under a license, natural resources
exploration and exploitation, project financing or Build Operate and Transfer schemes.
The concept of ‘regulatory fairness’ or ‘regulatory certainty’ has been used in this
respect”).
117 Id.; see also Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation)
and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award (22
May 2007), ¶ 262 (In the context of a renewable electricity plant that required a number
of years to be in operation so that the investor could benefit from the capital expenses,
the tribunal argued, “[W]hat seems to be essential . . . is that these expectations derived
from the conditions that were offered by the State to the investor at the time of the
investment and that such conditions were relied upon by the investor when deciding to
invest.”).
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Notwithstanding the differences between physical and intangible
protection, there is a doctrinal consensus, supported by case law, that
the standard is one of due diligence.118 States are not obliged to provide
protections that will cover any type of damage.119 The liability is not
considered strict.120 Rather, States are under the obligation to act as any
reasonable government would act in the same circumstances.121
In defining the extent and content of “due diligence,” leading
commentators, such as Professor Freeman, have found that it should be
measured as what a “well-administered government would be expected
to exercise in similar circumstances.”122 Professor Freeman’s formula
has been replicated by investment tribunals and defined as an
“objective” standard of vigilance that could be “legitimately expected”
from a “reasonably well-organized modern State.”123
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), after analyzing some resolved cases from international
investment tribunals, described the full protection and security
standard in the following terms:
[W]hile not an obligation of result, an obligation of good faith
efforts to protect the foreign-owned property has been
established by these recent cases, without special regard for
the resources available to do so. This has been referred to as
a standard of ‘due diligence’ on the part of the host country.
As a result, this standard should be understood as being very
much a ‘living’ one. It places a clear premium on political
stability, and the obligation of host countries to ensure that
any instability does not have negative effects on foreign
investors, even above the ability to protect domestic
investors.124

118 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 149–53; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 456 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed.).
119 DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 109, at 61.
120 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 149–53.
121 Id.
122 Alwyn Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed Forces,
in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955).
123 AALP v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 77 (June 27, 1990);
see also IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I 170
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), quoted in DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD & MICHAEL W. REISMAN,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1054 (2014).
124 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes
Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, 40–41 (2005).
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In sum, States violate this standard when they are negligent.125 The
standard does not impose strict liability for all acts with repercussions
on the investment, and it should be compared to what any person would
expect from other governments in the same circumstances.
How does this translate to cases where indigenous communities or
other vulnerable groups generate social unrest against an investor’s
property? More importantly, should the investment regime consider
the role the companies play in provoking the unrest? The investment
tribunal in Bear Creek v. Peru faced this question and resolved that the
causal link between the unrest and the company’s actions in the
consultation process must be substantial enough to remove the mantel
of protection provided by the investment regime.126
2. Poking the Bear: Foreign Direct Investment and Social
Licenses
As explained above, when governments sign BITs, they pledge to
protect the companies doing business in their territories. Tribunals
might interpret the protection as an obligation to provide political and
social stability. The investment regime, however, is not clear on the
responsibility that the companies have in fostering good relationships
with the local population to maintain that stability. Consequently,
should the tribunals consider the corporate contributory responsibility
to social unrest when assessing the government’s failure to provide a
stable business environment?127 This question was discussed by the
Bear Creek tribunal in its 2017 decision.128
125

BROWNLIE, supra note 118, at 456.
Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award,
¶¶ 400–14 (Nov. 30, 2017).
127 For a review of the Bear Creek case, see Jean-Michel Marcoux and Andrew
Newcombe, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru: Two Sides of a ‘Social
License’ to Operate, 33 ICSID REV. 3, 653 (2018); Joshua Paine, Bear Creek Mining
Corporation v. Republic of Peru: Judging the Social License of Foreign Investment and
Applying New Style Investment Treaties, 33 ICSID REV. 2, 340 (2018).
128 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, at ¶¶ 400–14. For earlier cases in
which international human rights treaties intersected with States’ obligations to foreign
investors, see Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Ur Partuergoa
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016),
¶¶ 1199–1202. In Urbaser, the tribunal had to resolve the conflict between the
investment treaty protections to foreign investors and human rights relating to dignity
and adequate housing and living conditions. In that particular context the tribunal
stated that the State’s human rights duties “are complemented by an obligation on all
parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at destroying such
rights.” Id ¶ 1199. Moreover, the BIT had to be “construed in harmony with other rules
of international law of which if forms part, including those relating to human rights.” Id.
¶ 1200. See also South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award
(22 November 2018) (involving a mining concession in Bolivia that was canceled due to
126
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The Bear Creek case arose out of a mining project in the southern
Peruvian province of Puno.129 The project had the challenge of being
located in the Santa Ana region, located fifty kilometers from the border
with Bolivia, and surrounded several communities of the Aymara
tribe.130 Along with fulfilling many permitting requirements, for the
the unrest caused by indigenous communities, but which was later offered again to
international investors). Bolivia contended that the BIT must be interpreted in light of
other international obligations of the Bolivian State, including the American Convention
on Human Rights and the ILO Convention 169. The tribunal, however, disregarded
Bolivia’s claims based on the fact that it had not proven that these treaties were
recognized customary international law or that the United Kingdom (the country of
origin of the investor) was a party to the treaties. The tribunal also found that the
company could not claim a breach of its legitimate expectations when Bolivia canceled
the concession due to the social unrest because the company knew in advance that it
was operating in an area where indigenous communities resided and thus required
special care regarding its interactions with them. Id. ¶¶ 656–57. The tribunal ultimately
found that Bolivia breached the requirement to provide adequate compensation for the
cancelation of the concession and decided not to reduce the amount, even after
recognizing that the company contributed to the social conflict. Id. ¶¶ 874–76. See also
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL
Case, Award (12 January 2011). In Grand River, the members of a Canadian tribe
presented an investment claim against the U.S. for tax actions taken against the sale of
artisanal cigarettes produced in Canada but distributed in the U.S. Id. ¶ 1. The claimants
in the case tried to argue that as part of customary international law and the minimum
standard of treatment, the U.S. government should have consulted them before enacting
the general tax regulations that affected their investments. Id. ¶¶ 66–67. The tribunal
rejected the claim that the international commitments with indigenous communities in
the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights and the ILO Convention 169 were customary
international law that could fall within the definition of the minimum standard of
treatment of aliens. Id. ¶¶ 209, 217–21. See also Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,
UNCITRAL Case, Award (June 8, 2009). The Glamis Gold case involved a Canadian Mining
company investing in a California Desert Conservation Area that overlapped with the
Quechan Indian tribe’s reservation lands. Id. ¶ 10. Under California law, companies
operating in public lands were prohibited from using the land in such manner that
would cause severe or irreparable damage to tribal cultural and religious sites.
California also enacted new regulations requiring backfilling and grading for mining
operations in the vicinity of tribal sacred sites. Id. ¶ 11. The Canadian company
challenged the measures, arguing that these were arbitrary, discriminatory, and
targeted to the Canadian company’s projects in order to make it economically unviable.
Glamis contended that complying with the new regulations would constitute an
expropriation under NAFTA Chapter XI. Id. ¶ 11. The tribunal allowed the indigenous
communities to present an amicus brief arguing how the project would impact their
historical sites, their ability to practice sacred traditions, and their communal life and
development. Id. ¶¶ 285–86. Ultimately, the tribunal rejected the Canadian company’s
claim of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment as not reaching the level required in the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens. To the tribunal, California’s actions would
have to be “egregious and shocking,” making it impossible for the investors to access
justice. Id. ¶ 627. In order words, the standard required a blatant unfairness and a
complete lack of due process as evidence of the discrimination. In the case of the
regulatory actions taken by California, none of these elements were met. Id. ¶ 824.
129 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 140–49.
130 Id.
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project to move forward, the companies had to jump through two
critical legal hurdles: obtaining an environmental impact assessment
that included an outreach program with the affected communities, and
a “public necessity” decree granted by the Council of Ministers.131 Under
the Peruvian Constitution, foreign investors could not acquire land near
Peru’s borders unless the Council of Ministers issued a public necessity
decree.132 The decree was a way for the government to ensure that
foreign investment in the area would not jeopardize national security
and the State’s territorial integrity.133
The public necessity decree authorizing Bear Creek to acquire
mining rights for the Santa Ana Project was issued in November 2007.134
Bear Creek then acquired seven titles to mining rights from its
employee, a local Peruvian lawyer who obtained the titles in tandem
with the company’s application for the decree.135 The environmental
impact assessment, however, took longer and was followed by a number
of workshops organized by the company and the government to inform
the local population about the project.136 Even though the project
received a positive environmental impact assessment, social protests
arose.137 A majority of the communities opposed mining activities in the
area and felt unheard by the company and the government.138 The
unrest took several violent forms, including the burning of the
company’s camp, assault on government and company officials, and a
general strike in the region that lead to a blockade of the main bridge
between Peru and Bolivia.139 After three years of significant unrest in
Puno, the government revoked the public necessity decree.140
Bear Creek argued in the arbitral proceedings that revoking the
decree was tantamount to an expropriation of its investments because
the revocation was politically motivated and discriminatory.141
Moreover, according to the Canadian company, the government’s failure
to control the social unrest breached the full protection and security
131

Id.
Id. ¶ 124.
133 Id. ¶ 469.
134 Id. ¶ 149.
135 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 126–28.
136 Id. ¶ 556.
137 Id. ¶¶ 170, 172–91.
138 Id. ¶ 170; Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial
Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 1, 18–19.
139 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 170, 172–91.
140 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion,
¶ 1.
141 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 537–38.
132
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standard of the Peru-Canada Free Trade Agreement.142 The company
argued that the duty to consult and engage with communities was
primarily a State responsibility.143 Bear Creek did its part by organizing
workshops to inform the communities about the project and by offering
job opportunities to members living close to the site.144 According to
Bear Creek, it complied with Peruvian guidelines and regulations to the
satisfaction of the Ministry of Mines, and thus Peru could not blame the
company for the social opposition to the project.145 The government
argued, however, that the company was partly responsible for the
instability and had a duty to obtain a “social license” before investing in
the region.146 The fact that it complied with formal requirements did
not, according to the government, excuse the company from engaging
positively with the local communities.147 International law thus
mandated the company’s good faith, active participation in making sure
that the consultation process addressed community concerns.148
The investment tribunal sided with the company.149 The three
arbitrators recognized first that the company could have gone further in
its outreach activities, but they concluded that Bear Creek was not
legally required to do so and that the State could not prove that its
absence caused or contributed to the social unrest.150 In other words,
there was no evidence that obtaining the “social license” was legally
required or could have prevented the unrest.151 The fact that the
company “complied with all legal requirements with regard to its

142

Id. ¶¶ 535–36. The tribunal, however, decided not to analyze this claim since it
had already found the revocation of the decree to be an indirect expropriation of the
investment. See id. ¶ 544.
143 Id. ¶ 241.
144 Id. ¶¶ 146, 261, 406–07.
145 Id. ¶¶ 242–43.
146 Id. ¶¶ 256–57.
147 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 256–57.
148 Id.
149 Id. ¶¶ 558–59.
150 Id. ¶¶ 408, 410–12. For this point, the tribunal relied on the Abengoa S.A. y Cofides
S.A. v. United Mexican States Award where the tribunal held that, “[f]or the international
responsibility of a State to be excluded or reduced based on the investor’s omission or
fault, it is necessary not only to prove said omission or fault, but also to establish a causal
link between [the omission or fault] and the harm suffered. In other words, for the
argument to succeed, there must be evidence that if a social communication program
had been timely implemented since 2003, the 2009 and 2010 events that led to the loss
of the claimant’s investment would not have occurred.” Abengoa S.A. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, Award, ¶¶ 670–71 (Apr. 18, 2013).
151 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 408, 410–12.
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outreach to the local communities” was enough to consider the
company’s conduct sufficient.152
The tribunal downplayed the arguments presented by the NGO
representing members of the community.153 In an amicus brief and oral
testimony, the advocates for the Aymara tribe argued that the company
was not transparent in its dealings with the communities.154 The
workshops were done in Spanish, as opposed to Aymara, and focused
primarily on monetary and employment compensations.155 The
community’s main concerns involved preserving spiritual sites in the
mining area; the environmental impact that the activities would have on
the rivers, forest, and species; and the health impact on the
communities.156 Rather than being an opportunity to listen to the
communities’ concerns, the workshops served as a formality for the
company to offer economic benefits to some community members and
document that it tried to inform the rest.157 As with many of the other
cases presented in this Article, the Aymara people’s concerns could not
fully translate into economic demands.158 Their spiritual connection
with the land, their dependency on natural resources for their
subsistence, and the community relations fostered by their connection
with mother nature could not be substituted by some community
members’ job opportunities.159 Both the company and the government
ignored the Aymara tribe’s concerns during the consultation process, as
did the majority of the tribunal in the arbitration proceeding.
It is worth noting that Professor Phillips Sands was the only
arbitrator to recognize the role played by the company’s actions in the
emergence of the social unrest.160 Professor Sands agreed with the
majority in that the decree’s revocation was tantamount to
expropriation, and further agreed that “other and less draconian options
were available,” such as a suspension of the decree, to address the
growing social unrest.161 In his partially dissenting opinion, however,
he recognized that the tribunal should have reduced the amount of

152

Id. ¶ 412.
Id. ¶¶ 406–09.
154 Id. ¶ 218.
155 Id. ¶ 225.
156 Id. ¶¶ 224–26.
157 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 224–26.
158 Id., ¶¶ 408, 410–12.
159 Id. ¶ 226.
160 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion,
¶ 1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
161 Id. ¶ 2.
153
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awarded damages due to Bear Creek’s contribution to the social
unrest.162
Professor Sands disagreed with the majority’s assessment of the
connection between the company’s conduct and the circumstances that
gave rise to the social unrest and the revocation.163 In his words, “the
Project collapsed because of the investor’s inability to obtain a ‘social
license,’ the necessary understanding between the Project’s proponents
and those living in the communities most likely to be affected by it,
whether directly or indirectly.”164 To Sands, the company did not meet
the conditions necessary to build trust over the long term with the local
communities.165 Sands argued that the project required local support to
be viable because of its massive infrastructure and clear impact on the
region.166 A company engaging in such an activity could hardly expect
that the project would run smoothly in the long run without local buyin.
Professor Sands agreed with the tribunal’s majority that ILO
Convention 169 imposes direct obligations on States.167 Still, this fact
does not mean that the duty to consider the indigenous interests “is
without significance or legal effects for [foreign investors].”168 Article 15
of ILO Convention 169 mandates that companies and governments must
consult with local communities and include them in the project’s
benefits.169 Bear Creek, as a company engaging in a project that would
affect the lives of indigenous communities, had, “at best, a semidetached
162
163
164
165
166

¶ 1.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion,

167 Id. ¶ 9 (recognizing that both parties agreed that the Convention obligations
applied to the Santa Ana Project and that “[i]t is the case, of course, that the obligation
to implement the Convention is one that falls on States, by implementing the Convention
through national laws”)
168 Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
169 Id. ¶ 13. Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169 provides: “1. The rights of the
peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be especially
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use,
management and conservation of these resources. 2. In cases in which the State retains
the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources
pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which
they shall consult these peoples, with a view of ascertaining whether and to what degree
their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes
for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. These
peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the befits of such activities,
and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of such activities.” ILO Convention 169, supra note 71, at art. 15.
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relationship to the vital rights set forth in [Article 15] of the
Convention.”170 The government must provide the legal framework to
ensure that the consultation process complies with international law,
but the company must also take the appropriate actions to obtain the
“social license” necessary for the project to be successful in the long run.
If the companies are aware, as in Bear Creek, that the local communities
oppose the projects because their interests are ignored, they should
pause and reassess their outreach program.
Bear Creek’s strategy of moving forward with its failing outreach
plan, including offering jobs to only some Aymara community members,
fed into the unrest.171 Tribunals should not ignore such attitudes
toward the communities when assessing damages. To Professor Sands,
the international investment regime “is not . . . an insurance policy
against the failure of an inadequately prepared investor” to obtain a
social license.172 In light of Bear Creek’s “significant and material”
contributions to the unrest and that “its responsibilities are no less than
those of the government,” the tribunal should have reduced the
compensation owed to the company by half for the indirect
expropriation of its assets.173
D. The Missed Opportunity of the USMCA (NAFTA 2.0) to Resolve
the Clash
Most international investment and trade agreements were signed
in the decades preceding the end of the cold war.174 The main
discussions in the international economic community revolved around
the challenges faced by the decolonized developing nations and the
former Soviet republics in attracting capital from the financial capitals
located in Western democracies.175 Hence, it is no surprise that the
system created around investment and trade agreements ignored the
170

¶ 12.
171

Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion,

Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 37 (“It may be the function of a State or its central government to deliver a
domestic law framework that ensures that a consultation process and outcomes are
consistent with Article 15 of ILO Convention 169, but it is not their function to hold an
investor’s hand and deliver a ‘social license’ out of those processes. It is for the investor
to obtain the ‘social license,’ and in this case it was unable to do so largely because of its
own failures. The Canada-Peru FTA is not, any more than ICSID, an insurance policy
against the failure of an inadequately prepared investor to obtain such a license.”).
173 Id. ¶ 39.
174 Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach, supra note 61 at 481–83 (describing the role
played by the World Bank in designing a system to attract foreign direct investment to
less developed nations).
175 Id.
172
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impact that investment could have on minorities in the host State. What
is surprising is the fact that the most recently negotiated international
trade and investment agreement in North America failed to conclusively
address this issue. The following Section will explain how the USMCA,
enacted in 2020, had the opportunity to remedy the clash of rights headon. Even though the agreement changed foreign investment protection
in the region, it ultimately illustrated the classical and utilitarian view of
property rights applied to the extraction of natural resources.
On January 16, 2020, the U.S. Senate, with an eighty-nine to ten
vote, adopted implementing legislation for the revised USMCA.176 This
was a surprisingly bipartisan vote considering that House of
Representatives managers presented the first articles of impeachment
against President Donald J. Trump the same day.177 Mexico ratified the
agreement in June 2019, but House Democrats were able to convince
White House negotiators to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms on
the labor chapter with inspections, sending the ratification process into
chaos.178 Notwithstanding the blow to its sovereignty, Mexico accepted
the implementation legislation, and the two nations ratified the
agreement.179 Canada’s ratification followed on March 13, 2020.180
The historic negotiation of the USMCA in the middle of an
impeachment trial, with a change of administration in Mexico a year
earlier and a reluctant Canada, also started a fundamental conversation
about the clash of indigenous rights and foreign investment.181 The
initial round of negotiations included a Canadian proposal for a chapter
on indigenous rights that would have recognized their “roles in the
176

Emily Cochrane, Senate Votes to Pass Revised NAFTA, Sending Pact to Trump’s Desk,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/us/politics/usmcavote.html.
177 Id.
178 Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes First Country to Ratify New North American
Trade Deal, WASH. POST (June 19, 2019, 8:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/mexico-becomes-first-country-to-ratify-usmca-north-americantrade-deal/2019/06/19/500dd8c0-92b3-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html; Katie
Lobosco, Natalie Gallón, Allie Malloy & Maegan Vazquez, US and Mexico Say Trade Deal
Is On Track After Hurried Last-Minute Objections, CNN (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:41 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/16/politics/usmca-mexico-labor-concerns/
index.html.
179 Id.
180 David Ljunggren, Canadian Parliament Rushes Through Ratification of USMCA
Trade Pact, REUTERS (March 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradeusmca-canada/canadian-parliament-rushes-through-ratification-of-usmca-trade-pactidUSKBN2102I5.
181 Jorge Barrera, New Trade Agreement a “Step Up” from NAFTA on Indigenous Rights,
CBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/usmca-tradedeal-indigenous-rights-1.4846073.
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conservation of the environment, sustainable fisheries, forestry and
biodiversity conversation.”182 In the final text, Canada’s proposal was
reduced and transferred to Chapter 32, Exceptions and General
Provisions.183 Article 32.5 provides that “this agreement does not
preclude a Party from adopting or maintaining a measure it deems
necessary to fulfill its legal obligations to indigenous peoples.”184 The
exception covers the entire USMCA. The only caveat is that such
measures are not “used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination against persons of the other Parties or a disguised
restriction on trade in goods, services, and investment.”185
For the first time in the region, a treaty recognized the importance
of other international obligations vis-a-vis trade and investment rights.
The treaty does not, however, recognize community-oriented property
rights as the original Canadian draft did and does not uphold the
responsibility of the State to protect those rights above the rights of
foreign investors and trade agreements. In the context of energy
infrastructure, it is unclear how Article 32.5 would apply. For example,
if the State conducts a previous and informed consultation but the
communities still reject the investment project in their lands, the State
could argue that it had fulfilled its legal obligations to indigenous people
and move forward with the project. Moreover, as the Bear Creek case
described above shows, for investment tribunals, the State still has a
duty to consult the communities. Suppose the government conducts a
consultation process that does not achieve full consent from the
communities and eventually faces international outcry in human rights
tribunals. If the State decides to cancel the project, would the investors
still be able to bring investment claims? Does Article 32.5 release the
State from any liability for the government’s failure to protect investors
from a lack of official adequate consultation processes? The USMCA is
silent on this issue. What is clear is the fact that if a concrete case arises,
and the State raises a defense under Article 32.5, an international
investment tribunal will have to analyze whether the State’s action was
done to fulfill its obligations with indigenous people, subjecting the
government’s measures to international scrutiny. But this review is an
ex post analysis after the conflict emerges, not an a priori recognition of
the value of indigenous culture over other public benefits defined by the
182

Id.
Id.
184 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Nov. 30, 2018, 134 Stat.
11, art. 32.5 (2020), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA].
185 Id.
183
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State. Even if the USMCA is a good step forward to resolving the clash of
rights, we still do not have an international treaty that prioritizes the
protection of communities over the State and investors’ rights.
Another example of how the USMCA was a missed opportunity to
avoid the clash of rights is its loose reference to corporate social
responsibility.186 Specifically, Article 14.17 is an invitation to promote
corporate social responsibility—a far more benign approach than an
imposition of a duty on signatories:
[The three states] reaffirm the importance of each party
encouraging enterprises operating within its territory or
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their
internal policies those internationally recognized standards,
guidelines, and principles of corporate social responsibility
that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party, which
may include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.187
As examples of the issues that the standards, guidelines, and
principles may address, the three States included “labor, environment,
gender equality, human rights, indigenous and aboriginal people’s rights,
and corruption.”188 This provision only recognized the importance to
promote these principles, rather than a duty of the signing parties or a
requirement for investments made in each State.
Notwithstanding the missed opportunity to address directly the
clash of rights, the investment chapter did advance four elements that
will change the way foreign direct investment is protected in the
region.189 First, it defined more broadly the term investment and
enumerated a nonexclusive list of examples that include licenses and
concessions.190 Second, Canada and the U.S. would not be subject to the
investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. Moreover, Mexico
and the U.S. will be subject to the mechanism only for breaches of
national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, or direct
expropriation.191 Notably, however, the USMCA excludes from these
limitations Mexican government contracts with oil and gas companies,
as well as contracts for power generation, telecommunications,

186
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at art. 14.17.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
USMCA, supra note 184, at art. 14.1.
Id. at art. 14.4, 14.5.
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transportation, and infrastructure companies.192 These types of
investments receive the full protection of the investment chapter and
have their own dispute resolution provisions.193 Third, the USMCA
further clarified the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including
full protection of security, to limit responsibilities to only what is
required under customary international law.194 Finally, the agreement
created exceptions to claims against the adoption of environmental,
health, and “public welfare” policies.195 In this way, any policies under
the social/environmental umbrella would not be considered a violation
of the foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.
The USMCA, however, also serves as a reaffirmation of the way
liberal and utilitarian views of property rights inform the role of
sovereigns in the extraction of natural resources.196 Chapter 8
specifically regulates the ownership of hydrocarbons. It serves as a
confirmation that Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. fully respect each other’s
sovereign rights to regulate the extraction of hydrocarbons “in
accordance with their respective Constitutions and domestic laws, in
the full exercise of their democratic processes.”197 It specifies that in the
case of Mexico, the United States and Canada recognize that it “reserves
its sovereign right to reform its Constitution and its domestic
legislation,” and that it “has the direct inalienable, and imprescriptible
ownership of all hydrocarbons in the subsoil of the national territory,
including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone located
outside the territorial sea and adjacent thereto.”198 And consistent with
192 Id. at Annex 14-E (Annex 14-E specifies that it only applies to government
contracts signed in Mexico in the covered sectors. The USMCA does not contain a similar
provisions for government contracts signed with Canada and the U.S.).
193 Id.
194 Id. at art 14.6.2 (“For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment
to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’
and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The
obligations in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) ‘fair and equitable treatment’ includes the
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal
legal systems of the world; and (b) ‘full protection and security’ requires each Party to
provide the level of police protection required under customary international law.”)
195 Id. at art. 14.16 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory
is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health, safety, or other regulatory
objectives.”).
196 USMCA, supra note 184, at chap. 8.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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the views that the agreement is primarily designed to protect foreign
investors, Chapter 8 specifies that the recognition of the State’s property
over the hydrocarbons is “without prejudice of their rights and
remedies available under this Agreement.”199 In other words, States
have the sovereign right to regulate the extraction of the resources
contained in their territory and can modify their legislation according to
their own democratic processes, but the rights of companies that have
signed contracts with the State shall be respected in accordance with the
USMCA. This is a clear example of how companies become an extension
of the State for the purposes of oil and gas extraction, and of how
international law extends a mantel of protection against discriminatory
policies taken against them. The USMCA does not, however, extend the
same level of protection to communities.
III. EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS CLASHING FROM OIL FIELDS IN ECUADOR TO TAR
SANDS IN CANADA
The following Part provides concrete examples that exemplify the
clash of interests that arise when the State authorizes foreign investors
to build energy infrastructure over indigenous land. This Part
emphasizes the arguments presented by the three parties involved—
the State, the companies, and the indigenous communities—and sheds
light on the fact that the analysis for finding a breach of international
obligations turns into a monetization of the value of the affected
property, be that indigenous land or foreign investor assets. As Section
III.A will show, the primary remedy offered by international law, with
its heavy emphasis on the economic value of property, benefits the
foreign investors to the detriment of the communities. A note of caution
is warranted. This Part does not substantially discuss domestic
proceedings initiated by the parties involved or how domestic
legislation regulates the rights of indigenous people or foreign
investors. It only refers to local proceedings and regulations to the
extent that they connect with the arguments brought by the affected
parties to international proceedings.

199

Id.
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A. A Tale of Two International Tribunals: The Burlington Resources
ICSID Case and the Sarayaku People in the IACtHR Case
In the past two decades, Ecuador has been accused five times of
violating the right of foreign companies investing in the hydrocarbons
sector.200 All of these cases involved investments from foreign nationals
in the Ecuadorian Amazonian region, which contains hydrocarbon
fields.201 Out of these five cases, the full protection and security
principle was mentioned three times as one of the violated rights.202 The
violations were alleged to have originated from legislation that affected
the original contractual obligations between Ecuador, its state-owned
company, Petroecuador, and foreign investors.
In one of those cases, Occidental Petroleum claimed $1.77 billion in
damages.203 Ecuador was found in breach of international law in only
some of the three cases. But the fact is that Ecuador has a reputation for
not protecting foreign energy-related investments. This reputation has
even led the State to denunciate its consent to the International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention in 2009.204

200 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final
Award, ¶ 30, 208 (Aug. 31, 2011); Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (June 30, 2011); Burlington Res. Inc. v.
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 26 (June 2, 2010);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (Sept. 9, 2008); EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No.
UN3481, Award, ¶ 26, 27, 107 (Feb. 3, 2006); Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of
Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, ¶ 6, 25, 27 (July 1, 2004).
201 Chevron Corp., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award, ¶ 208, 211; Perenco
Ecuador Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1; Burlington Res.,
Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 15; Occidental Petroleum
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 2; EnCana Corp., LCIA Case
No. UN3481, Award, ¶ 35; Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final
Award, ¶ 27.
202 Chevron Corp., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award, ¶ 39; Burlington Res.
Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 212; Occidental Expl. & Prod.
Co., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, at ¶ 179.
203 Occidental Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 876; Tai-Heng
and Lucas Bento, ICSID’s Largest Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum
Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-inhistory-an-overview-of-occidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador.
204 In October 2007, the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) received a notice from the Republic of Ecuador that it will
no longer consent to ICSID jurisdiction as a forum for resolving mining and energy
disputes with foreign investors. The denunciation was extended to all disputes on July
6, 2009. Kate Cervantes-Knox & Elinor Thomas, Ecuador Terminates 12 BITs—A
Growing Trend of Reconsideration of Traditional Investment Treaties?, DLP PIPER, (May
15, 2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/mexico/insights/publications/2017/05/
ecuador-terminates-12-bits-a-growing-trend; see also ICSID News Release,
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One of the best-known cases in the United States involved Chevron
Corporation/Texaco because tribe groups affected by its operations in
Ecuador filed class actions against its parent company in the United
States.205 In those proceedings, U.S. courts rejected the complaint
according to the principle of forum non conveniens, and the local
plaintiffs had to go back to Ecuador and initiate proceedings there.206
The case became an international sensation when the Ecuadorian courts
issued a $9.5 billion judgment against Chevron for the contamination of
the Lago Agrio region.207 In response, Chevron/Texaco brought a claim
against Ecuador for denial of justice in an investment tribunal through
the Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty and parallel RICO claims
against the lawyer representing the indigenous communities, Steven
Donzinger, for false statements and fraudulent proceedings in
Ecuador.208
But there are other examples of the interplay between foreign
investors and indigenous rights that are less studied. One example is
the case of Burlington Resources against Ecuador and the parallel
proceeding brought by the Sarayaku tribe against the State in the
IACtHR.209 The Burlington Resources/Sarayaku people case is a
paradigmatic example of the interplay between human rights and
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention by Ecuador (July 09, 2009), https://icsid.world
bank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/denunciation-icsid-convention-ecuador.
205 Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 393, 394 (2d Cir. 2010);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
206 When the Ecuadorian courts found for the plaintiffs, Chevron/Texaco brought a
claim against Ecuador for denial of justice in an investment tribunal through the
Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. See Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador (II), PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections of the Republic of Ecuador, ¶ 161
n.238 (Aug 31, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/cases/257.
207 Jonathan Stempel, Lawyer Who Took on Chevron in Ecuador is Disbarred in New
York, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-donzigeridUSKCN25A2P4.
208 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II (20 August, 2018), available at the
press release by Chevron summarizing the claims against Ecuador for denial of justice
in Ecuadorian courts (Sept. 2018), http://chevron.com/stories/international-tribunalrules-for-chevron-in-ecuador-case. For the U.S. claims, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger,
No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 1087236, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013); Chevron Corp.
v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24086 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013);
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), injunction vacated on other grounds,
Chevron Corp. v. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012). See generally Chevron’s
website, AMAZON POST, http://www.theamazonpost.com, about the litigation which
contains court documents, video clips, media reports and other background on the case.
209 Christina Binder & Jane A. Hofbuer, Case Study: Burlington Resources Inc. v.
Ecuador/Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, INT’L L. ASS’N,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810062.
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investment claims at the international level. It further exemplifies how
the rights of indigenous people, through the lens of liberal and
utilitarian property law interpretations, overlap with the property
rights of foreign companies.210
The facts of the case begin in 1996 when Petroecuador signed a
production sharing contract (“PSC”) with an Argentinean-based
company, CGC, for the development of two oil reserves in the Amazonian
region.211 Blocks 23 and 24 were located in a territory traditionally
inhabited by indigenous communities, the largest of which belonged to
the Sarayaku tribe.212 According to the terms of the PSC, the government
was responsible for relations with the indigenous communities, and for
obtaining third-party permits, rights-of-way, or easement that might be
necessary for the development of the area.213 But the contractor was
required to submit an environmental impact assessment for the
exploration phase, which included a description of the social, economic,
and cultural aspects of the population in the area.214 The assessment by
the company was completed and approved by the government in
1997.215
The Sarayaku tribe, composed of around 1,200 people, received
official recognition and title to their land from the government in
1992.216 The title was designed “to protect the ecosystems of the
Ecuadorian Amazon basin, to improve the living standards of the
indigenous communities, and to preserve the integrity of their
culture[.]”217 But the title also recognized the fact that it should “not
limit the State’s authority to build roads, ports, airports and other
infrastructure needed for the country’s economic development and
security,” and that the “[s]ubsoil natural resources are the property of
the State, which may exploit them without interference provided that
environmental protection standards are observed.”218

210 The case involved indigenous communities bringing claims to the IACtHR and a
company bringing claims against the State for lack of full protection and security.
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 2 (June 27, 2012); Burlington Res.
Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 53 (June 2, 2010).
211 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 64.
212 Id. ¶ 65.
213 Id.
214 Id. ¶ 68.
215 Id. ¶ 69.
216 Id. ¶¶ 52, 61.
217 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 62.
218 Id.

GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

1164

4/21/2021 5:43 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1121

To preserve the social, cultural, economic, and environmental
integrity of the communities, the government declared in the title that it
would “take into account the plans and programs that, to this end, are
prepared by the respective indigenous communities and submitted to
the Government’s consideration.”219 The “taking into consideration”
provision did not establish an upfront right to be consulted regarding
projects related to the extraction of mineral resources or the
infrastructure around such operations.
In 1998, two years after CGC signed the PSC, Ecuador ratified ILO
Convention No. 169.220 In 2001, the government modified the
environmental regulations for hydrocarbon operations to include the
right of previous and informed consultation of indigenous communities.
The law describes a consultation process requiring the government to
“hear their suggestions and opinions.”221 If the government reached an
agreement with the communities, the contract had to be “drafted
according to the principles of compensation and reparation for possible
environmental impacts and damage to property that the execution of
the fuel production projects might cause.”222
Additionally,
compensation for the loss or damage of property “shall be calculated on
the basis of the official tables in force.”223 Hence, the right of
consultation is not a veto but rather a process where communities might
raise their concerns and receive upfront compensation for the damage
to or loss of property.
The conflict between the company and the communities started
right after the environmental impact assessment was completed in
1997 and continued throughout the first years of the exploration
stage.224 In 1999, the government approved the suspension of activities
in Block 23 because the companies’ “activities [were] being affected by
actions against the workers by indigenous organizations and
destruction of the camp.”225 As a consequence, “the Ecuadorian Ministry
of Defense signed a Cooperation Agreement on Military Security with
the oil companies . . . in which the State undertook ‘to ensure the safety
of oil facilities, and of the persons who work in them.’”226

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id.
Id. ¶ 70.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id.
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 77.
Id. ¶¶ 69, 72, 81.
Id. ¶ 72
Id. ¶ 78.
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The communities’ opposition was considered force majeure, and as
such, the suspension was extended several times until September
2002.227 At that point, CGC had transferred 100 percent of its interests
in Block 24 and 50 percent of its interests in Block 23 to Burlington
Resources, an American-based company.228 In that year, CGC issued an
updated environmental impact study and the government allowed it to
proceed with its operations. As the drills and explosives began to arrive,
the communities organized camps around the field access points and
protested the company’s incursion onto their land. According to
Burlington, the “opposition from the indigenous communities, in the
form of violent attacks and death threats, intensified following
Burlington Ecuador’s acquisition.”229 Examples of these attacks
included “the destruction of the contractors’ seismic study base, the
setting on fire of their camp, and the kidnapping of several
employees.”230 The attacks continued until Burlington sought to trigger
the force majeure clause in the contract due to its inability to securely
access the fields. In response, the Sarayaku claimed that the
government had not consulted them before authorizing the projects.
The companies tried to negotiate with the Sarayaku people,
offering monetary compensations, medical care, jobs, and other
benefits.231 Part of the company’s strategy involved hiring a “team of
sociologists and anthropologists dedicated to planning community
relations.”232 The operator also faced challenges in identifying adequate
representatives of the communities, and hence engaged in negotiations
with the communities both individually and with the communities’
elected leaders under the Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas de
Pastanzas (OPIP). OPIP viewed the company’s negotiation team as
intruders who were trying to divide the communities, manipulate the
leaders, and carry out defamation campaigns.233 Notwithstanding the
negative view of the negotiation team, five communities accepted the
benefits, including payments that ranged between $50,600 and
$222,600 per community, and formed a group in support of the
company’s operations.234 Nevertheless, OPIP leadership rejected all of
227

Id. ¶ 72, 81, 83.
Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 14–17 (June 2, 2010).
229 Id. ¶ 30.
230 Id. ¶ 35
231 Id. ¶ 32; Binder & Hofbuer, supra note 209, at 5.
232 Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 75 (June 27, 2012).
233 Id. ¶ 75.
234 Id. ¶¶ 73–74. According to the record in the IACtHR’s decision, “On August 26,
2002, the CGC submitted to the Ministry of Energy and Mines the following five
228
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the proposals, arguing that the companies had no right to enter their
lands and that the company was fostering division among them by
reaching individual deals. The division among the communities was so
stark that violent attacks, threats, and harassment among different
members of the Sarayaku people occurred between 2003 and 2004,
forcing the Ecuadorian police to intervene to keep peace in the region.235
By mid-2003, the oil company had placed several explosives that
destroyed caves, water resources, and underground rivers, and also cut
down trees and plants that held sacred and cultural value to the
communities.236 Moreover, seismic lines passed near sacred sites used
for religious ceremonies of the Sarayaku people.237 It was at this point
that things began escalating to the international fora.
1. The Paralleled Proceedings: Tribes to the IACtHR and
Investors to an ICSID Arbitral Tribunal
Both the communities and investors brought claims against
Ecuador in international tribunals for the same policies and events that
led to the conflicts in the Amazon. As the history of the proceedings
below shows, the same actions can be categorized by one tribunal as
violations of the title awarded to the communities and of their right to
be consulted, but in another tribunal, as violations of the full protection
and security of the foreign investors’ property rights.
i. The IACtHR Process
In 2003, a couple of years into the conflict, the Kichwa People of
Sarayaku filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights.238 The Commission investigated the human rights
violation claims therein, issued a report in 2009, and brought the case
to the IACtHR a year later. In its initial report, the Commission argued
that Ecuador breached international human rights through the
“granting by the State of a permit to a private oil company to carry out
investment agreements signed with indigenous communities or associations on August
6, 2002, before the Second Notary of the canton of Pastaza: FENAQUIPA Organization,
US$194,000.00; AIEPRA Organization, Jatun Molino community and Independent
Communities of Sarayaku, US$194,900.00; FENASH-P Federation, US$150,000.00;
Association of Indigenous Centers of Pacayaku, US$222,600.00, and Achuar Community
of Shaimi, US$50,600.00. These agreements, with the respective plan of action, were
based on contributions to production projects, infrastructure, job training, health and
education to be made as the seismic survey activities were carried out in their
territories.” Id. ¶ 82.
235 Id. ¶¶ 106, 107–11.
236 Id. ¶¶ 104–05.
237 Id. ¶ 105.
238 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 1.
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exploration and exploitation activities in the territory of the Kichwa
Indigenous People of Sarayaku . . . without previously consulting them
and without obtaining their consent.”239 The Commission went further.
It stated that “the company began the exploration phase, and even
introduced high-powered explosives in several places on indigenous
territory, thereby creating an alleged situation of risk for the population
because, for a time, this prevented them from seeking means of
subsistence and limited their rights to freedom of movement and to
cultural expression.”240 Based on these facts, the Commission asked the
IACtHR to “declare the international responsibility of the State for the
violation of . . [t]he right to private property, recognized in Article 21, in
relation to Articles 13, 23, and 1(1) of the American Convention, to the
detriment of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku and its members.”241 The
Commission also asked the court to declare the State in violation of the
rights to life, judicial guarantees, judicial protection, freedom of
movement and residence, personal integrity, and the obligation to adopt
domestic legal measures to implement the American Convention.242 The
Commission’s request is a clear example of how the structure of the
claim in international tribunals begins with a liberal and utilitarian
private property approach to conflicts that emerge between
communities and extractive industries. Tribes might not perceive the
question as one of private property but as one involving social, cultural,
and religious relationships with the land they inhabit. Still, the
international legal system forces them to frame the questions around
property rights.
Some elements in the IACtHR’s decision allow us to perceive the
different views that the communities have around the land. For
example, after the Commission filed its claim before the IACtHR, the
communities were invited to submit their observations to the original
complaint filed by the Commission, and they added the right to culture
as one that should be included in the case file.243 The tribe believed that
239

Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
241 Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Article 13 recognizes freedom of expression and
thought, Article 23 recognizes the right to participate in government, and Article 1
recognizes the obligation to respect rights without any discrimination. American
Convention, supra note 95.
242 Id.
243 Id. ¶ 6 (Under Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR the
victims are not allowed to bring claims directly to the IACtHR. The Inter-American
Commission files the claims on behalf of the victims (Article 36). Under Articles 25, 42
and 43 of the Rules of Procedure, the IACtHR allows victims to file a brief in order to give
them an opportunity to voice their concerns or to add grievances not presented by the
Commission. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
240
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the activities had deprived them of a life according to their culture and
traditions. This was confirmed during the in situ visit to the fields,
where the communities expressed the grievances as a loss of “ancestral
knowledge” connected to forest in their land.244 Culture and ancestral
knowledge are two elements that are hardly captured by the liberal and
utilitarian approach to property rights. That approach, as explained in
the previous Sections, is primarily focused on the economic value of land
and its potential for wealth.
For the Sarayaku tribe, land ownership does not fit the traditional
utilitarian approach that the liberal and utilitarian conception inserts
into property rights. The Sarayaku communities are composed of
various ayllus (extended families) that are formed through marriages
that result in alliances.245 Farming is done in a communitarian way
through chakra (village farms), where families plant yucca, yam,
plantain, maize, potatoes, cane, fruit, palm trees, beans, chili peppers,
tomatoes, and squash.246 The chakras are also used for other purposes,
such as to cultivate medicinal plants and timber trees and to create
educational spaces for children to learn how to recognize and grow
plants for the community.247 The communities also build purinas-tambu
(seasonal communal facilities by the river), which are used for hunting
and fishing. Yachaks (shamans), who according to the tribe can
communicate with the natural world, assist with the selection of the
communal facilities.248 To the Saryaku, the forest is alive—kawsaka
sacha—and “every natural space is a llakta (village) with spiritual
populations.”249 In this way, the purinas-tambus are built with respect
for sacred locations, identifying suitable areas that will not lead to
overhunting or overfishing so that the activities allow for repopulation
of fauna.250 The Sarayaku communitarian method for farming, hunting,
and fishing covers 90 percent of the community’s dietary needs.
Given these communities’ perspective toward and connection with
the land, it is hard to picture how the liberal and utilitarian view of
property rights could fit. An attempt to do so would immediately
attempt to monetize the value of the property or to compensate with
approved by the Court in November 16–28, 2009, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm?lang=en).
244 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 23.
245 The Amazon Conservation Team, Sarayaku: In Defense of Territory,
https://www.amazonteam.org/maps/sarayaku-en (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.

GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2021 5:43 PM

2021] DRILLS AND PIPELINES CROSS INDIGENOUS LANDS

1169

other types of reparations involving a view that includes a cost-benefit
analysis. It would downplay the role of the social and spiritual relations
that emerge with their land as the guiding factor for resolving the
conflict. A clear example of how the cost-benefit analysis loses sight of
these dimensions can be found in the declarations of the Ecuadorian
government before the IACtHR, after recognizing the international
responsibility of the State. In the words of the Secretary of Legal Affairs
of the Presidency of Ecuador:
A new round [for the auction of the fields] will not begin
without informed consultation. And what is this consultation?
In particular, it deals with what was said about pollution; what
should not be polluted, because rivers and communities
cannot be polluted by oil activities . . . and we must discuss the
situation of the communities themselves. What is the health
situation? What about education? When we begin to discuss
the oil issue, we could have the best doctors treating the
mothers in the communities, we could have the best health
teams and best teachers coming from Quito to the area, if there
is going to be money generated by the oil exploration.251
The government’s view fails to capture the spiritual value of the
land and its connections to indigenous communities. Rather than
protecting the way the communities socially and culturally relate to the
forest, the government monetizes the problem and finds solutions that
translate into “bringing” outside elements into the community to
compensate for the damages caused by the extractive activities. The
best doctors and professors from the capital are to be brought into the
communities as if these actions were to be considered equal to, or even
better than, the loss of the “ancestral knowledge” that is affected by the
presence of the oil companies.
The liberal and utilitarian approach of monetizing the value of
property also failed during the negotiations between the companies and
the tribes in 2000, when CGC offered up to $60,000 for development
projects, to provide 500 jobs for men in the community, and to send a
medical team to provide care in several communities.252 Again, this is
an economic compensation approach to the loss of property. These
efforts failed because the Sarayaku tribe council felt that they did not
reflect the actual loss inflicted on the community.253

251 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 23 (June 27, 2012) (emphasis
added).
252 Id. ¶¶ 73–74.
253 Id.
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ii. The IACtHR’s Decision and Reparations
In June 2012, the IACtHR issued its decision, finding Ecuador in
violation of the Sarayaku people’s right to consultation. The decision
was groundbreaking for considering the cultural, social, and
environmental relations generated by property rights.254 But, as
explained below, it did not fully escape the liberal and utilitarian
conception of property rights recognized in international treaties. As
explained previously, tribal rights must work within the internationally
recognized conception of rights to protect their lands, and as such,
continue to be subject to the monetization of their property’s value.
For example, the IACtHR begins its analysis of property rights by
recognizing that a classical and textual reading of Article 21 of the
American Convention—the right to property—does not capture the
“close relationships between indigenous people and their lands, and
with the natural resources on their ancestral territories and the
intangible element arising from these.”255 Rather, Article 21, to
adequately protect indigenous lands, must be interpreted as a living
instrument that includes notions of land ownership and possession that
do not necessarily conform to classic conceptions of property.256 The
State must take into consideration indigenous culture, practices,
customs, and beliefs; otherwise, there would only be one way to think
about the use and disposal of the property—the liberal and utilitarian
conception. To properly protect indigenous property, we must ensure
that communities can continue their traditional way of living.257 In this
respect, the IACtHR decision is in line with the arguments presented in
previous Sections.

254
255
256
257

See Anaya & Puig, supra note 20.
Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 145.
Id.
Id. ¶ 146.
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In this light, the IACtHR extended the right of consultation into its
communal view of the right to property.258 For example, the State must
consult the communities during the early stages of the development
plan, and not when the project is already underway.259 In doing so, the
State must consult the communities in an active and informed manner,
and in accordance with the indigenous communities’ customs and
traditions.260 In addition, the State must conduct the consultation
process with the aim of reaching an agreement and ensure that the
communities are aware of the potential benefits and risks.261
According to the IACtHR, in the case of the Sarayaku tribe, Ecuador
and the company failed to fulfill the above requirements as established
by the right of consultation.262 It was the obligation of the State, not the
company, to comply with these steps. According to the court, the State
cannot delegate its duties to the private company or third parties.263 As
such, even if the company had lines of communication with the
communities and engaged in negotiations that resulted in some
agreements and the socialization of the project, the court held that those
efforts would not be enough. Moreover, the fact that the State had
delegated its duties was a breach of its international responsibility.264
The IACtHR described the company’s efforts to engage with the
communities and the presence of government officials in the area to
prevent violent spikes as efforts to benefit the companies as opposed to
the communities.265 The presence of military forces appears to
258

Id. ¶ 177 (“The Court has established that in order to ensure the effective
participation of the members of an indigenous community or people in development or
investment plans within their territory, the State has the obligation to consult the said
community in an active and informed manner, in accordance with its customs and
traditions, within the framework of continuing communication between the parties.
Furthermore, the consultations must be undertaken in good faith, using culturallyappropriate procedures and must be aimed at reaching an agreement. In addition, the
people or community must be consulted in accordance with their own traditions, during
the early stages of the development or investment plan, and not only when it is
necessary to obtain the community’s approval, if appropriate. The State must also
ensure that the members of the people or the community are aware of the potential
benefits and risks so they can decide whether to accept the proposed development or
investment plan. Finally, the consultation must take into account the traditional
decision-making practices of the people or community. Failure to comply with this
obligation, or engaging in consultations without observing their essential
characteristics, entails the State’s international responsibility.”).
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 177.
262 Id. ¶ 223.
263 Id. ¶ 187.
264 Id. ¶ 188.
265 Id. ¶ 190–98.
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encourage a climate of conflict and division. These efforts resemble
confrontation rather than attempts to prevent further clashes.266 As
such, the IACtHR completely ignored the fact that the companies
complained to the government that the communities were perpetrating
violence and damaging their property.267 As the next subsection will
show, foreign direct investors viewed the same acts that the IACtHR
described as designed to protect the companies as inadequate
protection under the investment treaties.268
The IACtHR considered that Ecuador, almost twelve years after the
signing of the contracts with foreign companies and ten years after the
ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, passed a constitutional
amendment to recognize the right to consultation. Article 57 of the 2008
Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes indigenous communities in
conformity with human rights agreements, including their “collective
rights” to “keep ownership, without subject to a statute of limitations, of
their community lands, which shall be unalienable, immune from
seizure and indivisible”; “[t]o keep ownership of ancestral lands and
territories”; and to “participate in the use, usufruct, administration and
conservation of natural renewable resources located on their lands.”269
Notwithstanding its recognition of the communal rights and the cultural
and collective nature of the indigenous lands, Article 57 clearly
identifies monetary compensation as the primary method to remedy
any damage to indigenous lands connected to infrastructure projects.
The wording of Article 57 is clear on this point. Indigenous communities
have collective rights to
free prior informed consultation, within a reasonable period
of time, on the plans and programs for prospecting, producing
and marketing nonrenewable resources located on their lands
and which could have an environmental or cultural impact on
them; to participate in the profits earned from these projects
and to receive compensation for social, cultural and
environmental damages caused to them. . . . If consent of the
consulted community is not obtained, steps provided for by
the Constitution and the law shall be taken.270

266

Id.
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 190–98.
268 Id.
269 República del Ecuador, Constitucion de 2008, art. 57, ¶¶ 5–7, translated in POL.
DATABASE OF THE AM., http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english
08.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).
270 Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
267
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Article 57 was implemented by Decree No. 1247, which was
adopted a month after the IACtHR published its decision finding
Ecuador in violation of the American Convention.271 The decree
establishes the steps for considering whether the right of consultation
was properly respected by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons. It specifies
the type of “social programs” that can be offered in the process of
consulting the communities, the actors that must be involved in the
process, and the certification of the consultation process. But the decree
clearly specifies that the process would not be considered null or invalid
if the communities decide not to exercise their right to participate in the
consultation.272 Only the Ministry has a duty to initiate and follow the
steps in the law, but it should not be confused with a veto on the project.
If the communities decide not to approve the project or to participate in
the offered social programs as compensation, the Ministry’s only
obligation is to record that and set up a contingency plan. The decree
also excludes all previous licenses and contracts signed by the State
from the obligation to conduct a consultation process according to
Article 57.
As pecuniary damages, the court ordered the State to pay
$90,000.273 It took into consideration all the expenses incurred by the
tribes in defending their rights, the territory and natural resources
damages, and the effects of the suspension of production activities on
the communities’ financial situation.274 The court also ordered the
payment of $1.25 million to compensate the community for the impacts
involving their spiritual relationship with their territory and spiritual
sites.275 Finally, to ensure nonrepetition of the actions, the court
ordered the State to:
1. Remove any remaining explosives on the sites;276
2. Implement adequate legislation ensuring that any future
project involving the ancestral land of the Sarayaku would be
subject to an effective consultation process as defined by the
court;277 and

271 Decreto núm. 1247 que dicta el reglamento para la ejecución de la consulta previa
libre e informada en los procesos de licitación y asignación de áreas y bloques
hidrocarburíferos, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?
p_lang=en&p_isn=98181&p_country=ECU&p_count=383 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020)
[hereinafter Ecuador Decree No. 1247].
272 Id. at Art. 19 & 20.
273 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 317.
274 Id. ¶¶ 316–17
275 Id. ¶¶ 322–23.
276 Id. ¶¶ 289–95.
277 Id. ¶¶ 296–302.
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3. Conduct a public act of acknowledgment of international
responsibility.278
As noted, these measures do not escape the tendency to favor a
monetization of indigenous property. The consultation process, even if
it is done following all the elements described by the court, ends up
leading to a monetization of the value of the property that leaves the
communities on the wrong side of the equation. Even in its decision, the
court recognized that as it was drafting its resolution, the State,
following its new amended constitution and legislation, was still
opening bidding rounds on indigenous lands. The court acknowledged
that it did not need “to rule on new oil bidding rounds that the State may
have initiated,” and reaffirmed that the State “should seek to carry out
activities or projects for the exploration or extraction of resources,”
making sure that the Sarayaku people are “previously, adequately and
effectively consulted, in full compliance with the relevant international
standards.”279 As explained above, the standard does not provide a
solution to projects that will ultimately affect the communities and their
relationship to their territories.
iii. The ICSID Proceedings
On April 21st, 2008, as the Sarayaku people were presenting their
case in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Burlington
Resources was filing a request for arbitration against Ecuador with the
ICSID.280 Burlington’s claims involved not only the lack of protection by
the Ecuadorian government from the indigenous community’s
intervention into the company’s operations but also the changes in the
tax legislation and violation of stabilization clauses in the contracts.281
The company requested the arbitral tribunal to order $1.5 billion in
compensation for the breach of Ecuador’s treaty obligations.
The ICSID arbitral tribunal that reviewed the case, in the end,
dismissed the company’s claims for failure to afford full protection and
security in the project on procedural grounds.282 Accordingly, the
278

Id. ¶¶ 303–05.
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 299.
280 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 53 (June 2, 2010).
281 Id. ¶ 26 (“The dispute between the Parties arises out of the following two factual
scenarios: (1) Ecuador’s purported failure to protect Burlington’s exploration and
exploitation activities in Blocks 23 and 24 from local indigenous opposition, and (2)
Ecuador’s enactment of measures which, purportedly in breach of its contractual and
Treaty obligations, unilaterally increased its participation under the PSCs on so-called
‘unforeseen surpluses.”).
282 Id. ¶¶ 316–18. The tribunal argued that the company was required to notify the
State of the existence of dispute regarding the lack of full protection and security, and,
279
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tribunal did not assess whether indigenous interests had any role to
play regarding the substantive issues or the proceedings.283
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the company’s claims are a perfect
example of the clash of internationally protected rights that arise from
prioritizing the economic value of property over its social component.
According to Burlington, Ecuador’s breach of the full protection
and security standard originated in Ecuador’s “failure to protect
Burlington’s exploration and exploitation activities in Blocks 23 and 24
from the indigenous oppositions.”284 The company’s recounting of the
facts included the several occasions in which the indigenous
intervention forced the company to declare the Blocks in force majeure
partly due to the communities’ opposition, but also due to the
communities “violent attacks and death threats.”285 Moreover, it
described the failure of the Ecuadorian government in assisting with the
negotiations with the communities and exercising its police powers,
forcing the company to maintain the force majeure status of its
operations.286
As evidence, Burlington submitted a letter from 2002 where CGC,
the operator of Block 23, requested the government’s assistance to
“intercede with its good offices, and take the measures [it] deem[ed]
necessary, with the purpose of ensuring that the Armed Forces and the
National Police w[ould] act resolutely to procure the liberation of the
hostages, as well as to facilitate the execution of the ongoing seismic
project. . . . [I]t is the duty of the Ecuadorian State, and PetroEcuador in
a particular, to guarantee the safety of the operations, as stated in our
contractual agreement and under appropriate constitutional norms.”287
As stated by the ICSID tribunal, the “tone and the context of the letter do
manifest a disagreement over rights and obligations.”288 The same plea
was made again in 2005, stating that the company had “not managed to
secure [Petroecuador] and the energy authorities’ effective intervention
in order to overcome the obstacles underlying the force majeure
situation. . . . [I]t is the duty of the Ecuadorian State, through its police
power, to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the security of its
according to its interpretation of the communications between the company and the
State, to deal with the indigenous communities opposition, these could not be
considered as triggering the required notification prior to the initiation of arbitral
proceedings.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id. ¶¶ 27–31, 35.
286 Burlington Res. Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 32–37.
287 Id. ¶ 319.
288 Id. ¶ 320.
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citizens in the territory.”289 The letters were accompanied with
evidence of the damages suffered as a result of the security situation in
the Blocks.
The facts, described by Burlington as grounds for Ecuador’s breach
of investment law obligations, are an example of the dynamic that
emerges when the State is pushed on both sides of the equation to
provide protection against the other party.
Ecuador did not contest the facts pertaining to the lack of
protection of the company’s operations. The government’s position was
that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the claim
because Burlington had failed to abide by a six-month waiting period
contemplated in the Treaty, and that Ecuador withdrew its consent to
resolve this type of dispute before Burlington brought them to
arbitration.290
According to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment (“Ecuador-U.S. BIT”), investors must wait six
months before bringing a treaty claim to an investment tribunal.291 To
Ecuador, there was never a disagreement between the government and
Burlington concerning the indigenous opposition in Blocks 23 and 24;
even if there was, Burlington never provided proper notice of it, and
hence did not comply with the six-month waiting period.292 In fact, the
government argued that Ecuador and Burlington, by accepting the force
majeure status, recognized that the events in question were beyond the
parties’ control, and in fact “‘there was a clear collaboration between
[the government and the company] to solve the issue’ in the Blocks
concerning the indigenous opposition.”293 In other words, the
government recognized that it had been cooperating with the
companies, and did not deny that the opposition from the communities
existed.

289

Id. ¶ 323.
Id. ¶ 95(iv) (“Burlington’s claim that Ecuador allegedly failed to provide full
protection and security for Blocks 23 and 24 is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
because: (a) Burlington failed to abide by the six-month waiting period, a condition for
consent under the Treaty; (b) Burlington failed to perfect consent before Ecuador
withdrew its offer to arbitrate this class of disputes pursuant to its declaration under
Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention.”)
291 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
Ecuador-U.S., Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15 (1993), at Article VI.3(a).
292 Burlington Res. Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 255,
258.
293 Id. ¶ 257.
290
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Ultimately, the ICSID tribunal dismissed the “full protection and
security” claims on procedural grounds. It found that the companies
had not provided the government adequate notice of the existence of the
dispute of a treaty claim and failed to comply with the six-month cooling
period required by the Treaty before bringing the claim to arbitration.294
But, as stated above, the tribunal accepted Burlington’s classification of
the indigenous resistance as a force majeure that was outside the
control of the company and prevented it from fulfilling its contractual
obligations.295 The ICSID tribunal did not assess the company’s role in
the failed consultation process with the communities.296 The indigenous
communities and their rights were treated as externalities in the
process.297
Ecuador was found liable for unlawfully expropriating Burlington’s
investments through the enactment of the new taxation regime.298
Before the tribunal calculated damages, Ecuador filed counterclaims
against Burlington for breaching its environmental obligations under
the contracts. Ultimately, the quantification of damages was reduced to
the environmental impact on the sites where the oil wells were
operating, but the decision made no mention of the communities.299 The
ICSID tribunal relied exclusively on Ecuadorian environmental law to
determine the quantification of damages owed to the Ecuadorian State
and completely ignored the communities’ grievances.300 In the end,
Ecuador was ordered to pay $380 million for the actions taken against
Burlington, while, as mentioned above, in the IACtHR, the State only paid
the communities $1.38 million.301

294

Id. ¶¶ 335–40.
Id. ¶ 34.
296 Binder & Hofbuer, supra note 209, at 8.
297 Id.
298 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability, ¶¶ 541–46 (Dec. 14, 2012).
299 Matthew Levine, Ecuador Awarded USD41 Million in Counterclaim Against U.S. Oil
and Gas Company Burlington Resources, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/ecuador-awarded-41-million-counterclaimagainst-u-s-oil-gas-company-burlington-resources-matthew-levine.
300 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Counterclaims, ¶¶ 48, 116, 328 (Feb. 7, 2017). The Tribunal only mentioned in its
decision that communities lived in Block 21, but there was no mention of the case before
the IACtHRs or the actions taken against the indigenous communities.
301 The IACtHR awarded US$90,000 for pecuniary damages and US$1,250,000.00 as
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra
note 87, ¶¶ 317, 323.
295
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B. Oil from Canada and North American Tribes: Keystone XL
The effect of energy infrastructure in tribal land is not unique to
developing nations. The United States, for example, is no stranger to
questions surrounding the clash between indigenous communities and
foreign investors.302 In three of the seventeen investment arbitration
cases in which the United States was a respondent, issues surrounding
indigenous people’s right to be consulted or land being affected by
foreign investors were brought up in the proceedings.303 The case
described below is the latest U.S. example of how investors have an
international recourse that prioritizes the quantification of damages
when communities’ protests affect their investments.304
But
communities are left with remedies that force them to fit their
conceptions of property into the liberal and utilitarian paradigm, and
hence, leave them on the wrong side of the equation.

302 See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 128; Grand River Enterprises
Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, supra note 128. For executive orders
seeking to address the consultation process with indigenous communities, see Pres.
George W. Bush, Executive, Memorandum: Government-to-Government Relationship
with Tribal Governments, Sept. 23, 2004; Pres. William J. Clinton, Executive Order
13175, Nov. 6, 2000 (consultation and coordination with tribal governments); Pres.
Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies—
Tribal Consultation, Nov. 5, 2009.
303 For a complete list of cases in which the U.S. has been a respondent, see United
States of America, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/223/
united-states-of-america/respondent (last visited Mar 6, 2021). The three cases
involving indigenous communities and foreign investors in the United States are Glamis
Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 128, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al.
v. United States, supra note 128; and TransCanada Corp. v. United States, Notice of Intent
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/TransCanada-Notice-of-Intent-January-6-2016.pdf [hereinafter Notice of
Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA].
304 This Article was written between October 2019 and January 2021. The Biden
administration’s decision was included during the editing process of the Article. As
such, it does not include any analysis of the TransCanada case after January 2021.
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1. A Politicized Keystone
On November 3rd, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest
stated, “I would venture to say that there’s probably no infrastructure
project in the history of the United States that’s been as politicized as
[the Keystone Pipeline].”305 As the next paragraphs will show, President
Obama’s Press Secretary was far from wrong when he described the
permit process of the Keystone XL pipeline.
The politicization of the project began with the existing legal
framework for issuing transboundary pipeline permits.306 In the U.S.,
the executive branch has traditionally issued Executive Orders
establishing a process for issuing permits to pipelines crossing into the
United States that would serve national interests.307 As Professor James
Coleman pointed out in his work, Congress has not provided a legal
framework regulating the issuance of such permits, and in the absence
of express Congressional authorization, presidents all the way back to
Lyndon B. Johnson have taken unilateral action to decide when and
under what circumstances cross-border permits are issued.308
In 2008, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LP applied to the U.S.
Department of State for a Presidential Permit to build a pipeline to carry
crude oil from Canada to the United States.309 When TransCanada filed
for the Keystone XL permit, there was plenty of precedent suggesting
that the pipeline would be approved.310 In fact, this was not the first
time oil from the Canadian province of Alberta was being transported
via pipeline to ease the demand for fuel in America.311 The petition itself
was no different from at least three previously granted permits to carry

305 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/03/press-briefingpress-secretary-josh-earnest-1132015.
306 James Coleman, TransCanada Sues U.S. Government for Rejecting Keystone
Pipelines, U. OF CALGARY FAC. OF L. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), https://ablawg.ca/2016/01/11/
transcanada-sues-u-s-government-for-rejecting-keystone-pipelines.
307 See Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 135.
308 Coleman, supra note 306 (describing how Congress had not provided a legal
framework for regulating oil pipelines that cross the U.S. international borders and how
“[i]n the absence of Congressional authorization, President Lyndon Baines Johnson
simply issued an executive order in 1968, Executive Order 11423, that established a
process for issuing permits to proposed oil pipelines that ‘would serve the national
interests.’ Then in 2004, President George W. Bush issued a new unilateral order,
Executive Order 13337 that expedited review of border crossings. Both executive
orders delegate decisions on these cross-border permits to the U.S. Secretary of State.”).
309 Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 120–21.
310 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
supra note 303, ¶ 1.
311 Id.
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oil from the same location.312 Keystone XL was intended to increase the
capacity of the existing system to process 168 billion barrels of tar sands
oil.313 It would transport around 830,000 barrels across the United
States to refineries on the Gulf Coast of Texas.314 Notwithstanding the
immense similarities, however, Keystone XL differed from previous
petitions in one glaring way: environmental groups and Native
American tribes opposed the expansion of the system.315
Leaders of the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of the Fort
Peck Reservation and the Cheyenne River tribe openly opposed the
pipeline.316 The opposition can be credited to the following: The
Keystone XL “would cross less than 100 miles from the headquarters of
the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and run directly through sacred
and historical sites as well as the ancestral lands of the Gros Ventre and
Assiniboine Tribes.”317 Moreover, the pipeline would cross the two
water sources for the Mni Wiconi Rural Water Supply Project, a water
delivery system owned and operated by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.318 In
the words of the Native American Rights Fund: “[t]here are countless
historical, cultural, and religious sites in the planned path of the pipeline
that are at risk of destruction, both by the pipeline’s construction and by
the threat of inevitable ruptures and spills if the pipeline becomes
operational.”319 These tribes also participated in the protests of their
neighboring tribe, the Standing Rock, who opposed the construction of
the Dakota Access pipeline that would bring shale oil from the Bakken
formation in North Dakota to an oil terminal in Patoka, Illinois.320
Together the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Standing Rock tribes established

312

Id.
Melissa Denchak, What Is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline.
314 Id.
315 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
supra note 303, ¶ 1; Denchak, supra note 313; see also Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline
Wars, supra note 22, at 121–24.
316 Phil McKenna, ‘We Will Be Waiting’: Tribe Says Keystone XL Construction Is Not
Welcome, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 13, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13
072018/keystone-xl-pipeline-native-american-resistance-oil-spill-cheyenne-riversioux-dakota-access-transcanada; Keystone XL Pipeline, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND,
https://www.narf.org/cases/keystone/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
317 Vanessa Romo, Native American Tribes File Lawsuit Seeking to Invalidate Keystone
XL Pipeline Permit, NPR (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/64652
3140/native-american-tribes-file-lawsuit-seeking-to-invalidate-keystone-xl-pipelinep; Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 316.
318 Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 316.
319 Id.
320 McKenna, supra note 316.
313
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semi-permanent camps near where the pipelines would cross under the
Missouri River, just upstream from the reservations.321
It was in the context of these social protests, both the
environmental and the tribal, in which Secretary of State John Kerry
denied the Keystone XL permit in 2015.322 The White House’s argument
for denying the permit involved U.S. national interests. The Obama
administration felt that U.S. leadership could be undercut in the ongoing
climate talks because the pipeline was “perceived as enabling further
[greenhouse gas] emissions globally.”323 In other words, the expansion
of a pipeline that would funnel billions of barrels of one of the “dirtiest”
crudes in the world into American refineries would contradict the goal
of reducing “dirty” oil consumption.324 Environmental and tribal
activists leaders were successful in their campaign against the
construction of the pipeline.325
2. TransCanada’s NAFTA Claims Against the U.S.
The Keystone Pipeline odyssey did not cease with the permit
denial. In January 2016, TransCanada filed a notice of intent to submit
an international investment claim to arbitration under NAFTA’s Chapter
XI. The company alleged that President Obama’s decision to cancel the
permit violated “core investment protections, including national
treatment (Article 1102), most-favored-nation treatment (Article
1103), treatment in accordance with international law (Article 1105),
and protection against uncompensated expropriations (Article 110).”326
To the Canadian investors, the President based his decision not on the
merits of Keystone’s application but on “politically-driven” factors that
violated U.S. obligations under NAFTA.327

321

Id.
See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA, supra note 303, ¶ 6.
323 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION 29
(2015), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/KeystoneXL
.Record-of-Decision.pdf [hereinafter 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION] (The
determination stated that “While the proposed Project by itself is unlikely to
significantly impact the level of GHG-intensive extraction of oil sands crude or the
continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States, it is critical for
the United States to prioritize actions that are not perceived as enabling further GHG
emissions globally”); Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 122.
324 See Denchak, supra note 313.
325 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA, supra note 303, ¶ 6.
326 Id. ¶ 8.
327 Id. ¶ 1.
322
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In their notice of intent, TransCanada insisted that the government
misled them into investing in the U.S. while the permit was pending
approval.328 As such, the company had legitimate expectations that the
project would move forward, and consequently began initial works on
the south end of the pipeline, “secure[d] thousands of land easements,
purchase[d] equipment[,] . . . and enter[ed] into long-term contracts
with shippers to transport the[ir] oil.”329 By misleading TransCanada
into investing in the project and yielding to the protesters and
environmental activists, the Obama administration had breached the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.
TransCanada grounded its contention on the fact that the State
Department’s 2015 determination concluded that the pipeline would
improve U.S. energy security, benefit the economy, and would be
unlikely to increase greenhouse emissions in Canada.330 In fact, the
report suggested that by moving the transportation of oil to a pipeline
instead of railroads, the project would reduce emissions in the United
States.331 Under TransCanada’s views, “there was nothing unusual
about the proposed pipeline or the oil it was intended to carry.”332 The
administration had approved similar projects from the same company
in the past (Keystone I pipeline), taking approximately twenty-seven
months or less to approve the permits.333 In the case of Keystone XL, the
refusal took seven years due to the pressures exerted by activists and
environmental groups, turning opposition to the Keystone XL “into a
litmus test for politicians.”334
328 Id. ¶ 2 (“TransCanada Corporation (‘TransCanada’) and TransCanada PipeLines
Limited (collectively the ‘Disputing Investors’) through their affiliates, including
Keystone, invested billions of dollars in the pipeline project while the Keystone XL
Pipeline application was pending, all with the reasonable expectation that the
Administration would process Keystone’s application fairly and consistently with past
actions.”).
329 Id. ¶ 2.
330 Id. ¶ ¶ 46–49; see also 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION supra note 323,
at 29–31.
331 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION, supra note 323, at 23 (“With regard to GHG
emissions, during operation of the No Action Alternative transportation scenarios,
including rail and combination modes, the increased number of trains along the rail
routes would produce GHG emissions from diesel fuel combustion and electricity
generation to support terminal operations. Annual GHG emissions (direct and indirect)
attributed to the No Action transportation scenarios would be greater than for the
proposed Project, but those emissions relate solely to the movement of equivalent
amounts of oil from Alberta to the Gulf Coast.”)
332 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
supra note 303, ¶ 1.
333 Id. ¶ 10.
334 Id. ¶¶ 1, 11.
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Moreover, TransCanada argued that the U.S. government, during
the seven years in which the permit was pending, looked very carefully
into the state-level litigation and required easements.335 The federal
government “worked with Keystone to develop at least [fifty-seven]
changes to the proposed pipeline project to ensure that the pipeline
would be built and operated in a manner that would protect health,
safety, the environment, and local communities.”336
Consequently, to TransCanada, the denial of the permit was solely
based on “perceived” negative effects on the communities and the
environment, not proven or documented effects that contradicted the
State Department’s previous findings.337 To TransCanada, the only
reason behind the decision was to appease the protesters and activists
who held a “false” belief.338
After the filing of TransCanada’s notice of intent, an ICSIDadministered proceeding against the United States was registered on
July 15, 2016.339 The total damages requested by TransCanada for
breach of the U.S.’s NAFTA obligations amounted to $15 billion.340 In
late 2016, the U.S. and Canada appointed their arbitrators, David R.
Haigh and Sean David Murphy.341 In early February 2017, the ICSID
Secretary was about to initiate proceedings to select the president of the
Tribunal when the parties agreed to suspend the proceedings for one
month. Donald J. Trump had been sworn in as the forty-fifth President
on January 20, 2017, and the future of the pipeline took a hard turn
again.342

335

Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 2.
337 Id. ¶ 7.
338 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
supra note 303, ¶ 7.
339 TransCanada Corp. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the
Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ¶ 2 (Mar. 24,
2017).
340 The Canadian Press, TransCanada Suspends $15-Billion NAFTA Suit on Keystone XL
Pipeline, STAR (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/02/28/
transcanada-suspends-15-billion-nafta-suit-on-keystone-xl-pipeline.html.
341 See TransCanda Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the Secretary-General
Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, at ¶ 4.
342 See The Canadian Press, supra note 340.
336
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3. The Trump Administration and the Case Before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
Environmentalists and tribe members had opposed the pipeline for
eight years, but it took four full days on the job for President Trump to
sign an executive action inviting TransCanada to resubmit the
controversial proposal.343 The Executive Order instructed the newly
appointed Secretary of State and former chief executive of ExxonMobil,
Rex Tillerson, to make a decision on the proposal within sixty days of
receiving the application.344 On March 23, 2017, the U.S. Department of
State granted TransCanada’s permit application, reversing the previous
administration’s decision. Suddenly, the pipeline’s environmental
effects and impacts on communities had no weight in the process. The
seven-year odyssey under one administration was seemingly resolved
in only fifty-six days by the newly elected president. The NAFTA claim
was discontinued upon TransCanada’s request the same day that the
Trump administration approved the permit.345
It is no surprise that the tribes and activists complained of the
Trump administration’s lack of explanation for why the previous
administration’s factual findings were discarded.346 According to the
tribes,
throughout the permitting process, there was no analysis of
trust obligations, no analysis of treaty rights, no analysis of the
potential impact on hunting and fishing rights, no analysis of
potential impacts on the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s unique water
system, no analysis of the potential impact of spills on tribal
citizens, and no analysis of the potential impact on cultural
sights in the path of the pipeline.347
The same week that the permit was approved, the Inter-American
Commission held a hearing with the tribes on the effects of expedited
environmental reviews and approval for high-priority infrastructure
projects (mainly the Dakota Access and Keystone XL pipelines) on tribal

343 Daniel Dale, Trump Signs Order to Quickly Approve Keystone Pipeline, Trudeau
Applauds, STAR (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/01/24/
trump-to-advance-controversial-keystone-xl-dakota-access-oil-pipelines.html.
344 Id.
345 TransCanda Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the Secretary-General
Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, at ¶ 10.
346 Letter from Rodney M. Bordeaux, President of South Dakota Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
to Rosebud Sioux Tribe Community (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.narf.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/20180910bordeaux-letter.pdf.
347 Natalie A. Landreth et al., Keystone XL Pipeline, Case Updates, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS
FUND, https://www.narf.org/cases/keystone (last updated Nov. 17, 2020).
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and community rights in the U.S.348 In the hearing, tribe leaders shared
with the Commission facts that reflected harassment from the U.S.
federal government and a lack of a previous informed consultation
process with the communities.349
As explained in previous subsections, the communities’
relationships with the land cannot be quantified in monetary terms.350
As President Bordeaux of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe explained in a letter
to the community after the Trump administration’s reversal of the
permit decision, the tribes “have an inherent obligation to protect the
health and wellbeing of [their] members as well as the health and
welfare of Unci Maka (mother earth).” 351 To the tribes, “the land, the
water, the air, and the Lakota People [(the seven Sioux tribes)] are one
in the same.”352
TransCanada tried to engage with the tribe leaders, offering to
“create opportunities for an open dialogue” and “discuss potential
opportunities for participation in the project.”353 Alas, the company’s
answer was ultimately the monetization of property rights. From the
company’s perspective, access to tribal lands depended on sharing some
of the projects’ economic benefits with them. In response, the tribal
leaders answered with a resounding, “You are not welcome on our
territory TransCanada.”354
In late 2018 and early 2019, the tribes filed several federal lawsuits
opposing the Trump administration’s decision.355 A judge for the United
States District Court for the District of Montana repeatedly blocked
TransCanada’s attempts to start construction.356 The courts’ reasoning
mainly relied on U.S domestic law: the lack of public notice; the lack of
required environmental and safety review by the State Department; the
348 Inter-American Commission Hearing on U.S. Executive Orders Before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR. (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://ijrcenter.org/inter-american-commission-hearing-executive-orders-travelban-environmental-review/.
349 Miller, supra note 20 (explaining how the right of consultation in international
treaties is also consistent with the spirit of the U.S. federal government and tribal
relations treaties and legislation).
350 Supra Section II.A.
351 Bordeaux, supra note 346.
352 Id.
353 McKenna, supra note 316 (referring to the letter sent by TransCanada to Tribal
Chairman Harold Frazier which was exposed on his twitter account); CRST Chairman
(@CRSTChairman), TWITTER (JUL. 12, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://twitter.com/CRST
Chairman/status/1017544831566921728.
354 Id.
355 See Landreth et al., supra note 347.
356 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Trump, 428 F. Supp. 3d 282 (D. Mont. 2019)..
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president’s authority to decide unilaterally on granting the permit; the
federal governments fiduciary’s duties over tribal lands; and Congress’s
role in exercising its exclusive power over international commerce.357
Notwithstanding the fascinating nature of these constitutional
questions, they are beyond the focus of this Article. For this Article, it is
worth mentioning that the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights monitored the situation regarding the construction of Keystone
XL and the North Dakota access pipeline. The U.S. has not recognized
the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, hence the most that the Commission
could do would be to issue precatory measures.358 But such measures
can only be taken once the tribes prove that the domestic judicial
proceedings are not addressing the violation of their human rights.
It is also worth mentioning that TransCanada alleged harm
resulting from the tribe’s judicial proceedings in U.S. federal court
halting construction.359 In December 2019, TransCanada stated in court
that “[a]bsent a stay of the permanent injunction, [it would] continue to
suffer irreparable harm.”360 In addition to the existing investments
made by TransCanada, it could also fall behind the permit’s schedule
because the injunction created a risk that TransCanada could lose its
workers.361
4. The Biden Administration and the Second Cancelling of
the Keystone XL Project
In January 2020, Joe Biden was sworn in as the 45th President of the
United States of America. During his campaign, he promised a plan for
a “clean energy revolution” that included making climate change and
environmental justice priorities of his administration’s energy
decisions.362 The promised policies included revoking the permit

357

Id.
Press Release, Tribes Ask International Human Rights Commission to Stop Violence
Against Water Protectors at Standing Rock (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.indianz.com/
News/2016/12/08/iachrpressrelease120216.pdf.
359 Karl Puckett, TransCanada: “Irreparable Harm” if Keystone XL Construction Doesn’t
Resume, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/
news/2019/01/08/transcanada-asks-court-lift-keystone-construction-ban-duringappeal-great-falls-judge-brian-morris/2516087002.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 9 Key Elements of Joe Biden’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution, JOE BIDEN FOR
PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/9-key-elements-of-joe-bidens-plan-for-a-cleanenergy-revolution (last visited Mar 5, 2021).
358
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granted by the Trump administration for the construction of Keystone
XL.363
On January 20, 2021, President Biden followed through with his
campaign promise and issued an executive order revoking the permit.364
The revocation order mentioned the State Department’s 2015
determination and reaffirmed that the project’s approval “would
undermine U.S. climate leadership by undercutting the credibility and
influence of the United States in urging other countries to take
ambitious climate action.”365 The order did not mention the effect that
the pipeline would have on indigenous lands, the environmental impact
of the pipeline’s construction in U.S. territory, nor the inadequate
consultation of indigenous people as justifications for the revocation of
the permit.366 In other words, the U.S. did not justify its decision based
on existing obligations or commitments with indigenous communities
but rather on the need to reestablish U.S. leadership in the fight against
climate change.
Canadian investors and the province of Alberta did not take long to
respond.367 Alberta’s Premier, Jason Kenney, publicly stated that to
“retroactively remove regulatory approval on the basis of which an
investment was made is, in my view, a slam dunk case of a claim for
damages through NAFTA under the investor protection provisions.”368
TransCanada Energy also issued a statement expressing its
disappointment with the action and announcing that it would “review
363

WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
RESTORING SCIENCE TO TACKLE THE CLIMATE CRISIS (2021), https://www.white
house.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-orderprotecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climatecrisis.
364 Id.
365 Id. at § 6.(b) (“In 2015, following an exhaustive review, the Department of State
and the President determined that approving the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would
not serve the U.S. national interest. That analysis, in addition to concluding that the
significance of the proposed pipeline for our energy security and economy is limited,
stressed that the United States must prioritize the development of a clean energy
economy, which will in turn create good jobs. The analysis further concluded that
approval of the proposed pipeline would undermine U.S. climate leadership by
undercutting the credibility and influence of the United States in urging other countries
to take ambitious climate action.”).
366 Id. at §§ 6.(c), 6.(d). The sections on which the order is based only mention the
threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security and the need to strengthen U.S.
international reputation to address it.
367 Robert Tuttle, Canada May Seek U.S. Payback via NAFTA After Biden Cancels
Keystone XL, WORLD OIL (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/2/4/
canada-may-seek-us-payback-via-nafta-after-biden-cancels-keystone-xl (last visited
Mar 5, 2021).
368 Id.
AND
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the decision, assess its implications, and consider its options.”369 The
fact that the Biden administration relied on the same arguments as the
ones expressed in the 2015 State Department determination leaves the
door open for TransCanada to reinitiate its NAFTA claim against the
U.S.370
The USMCA gives Canadian companies a three-year window to
bring claims against the U.S. government for existing investments.371
After that point, the ISDS mechanism will not be available for Canadian
companies.372 Any dispute would then have to be resolved solely in U.S.
courts. At this point, it is uncertain how U.S. courts would implement
the USMCA provisions under the new Chapter 14 or the references to
the obligations to indigenous peoples in Article 32.5.373 In the case of
TransCanada, the Biden administration’s revocation of the permit does
not mention the U.S. government’s duty to protect indigenous
communities. It is thus unclear whether the U.S. could even invoke
Article 32.5 as part of a plausible defense against TransCanada’s
investment arbitration claims. What is true, as explained in previous
Sections, is that the USMCA invites continued promotion of social
responsibility principles, but these principles are not a prerequisite for
the investment to be protected under the treaty.374 Moreover, it is
unclear how a tribunal might interpret a failure of the State to comply
with legal obligations to indigenous people as a pretext to modify
existing permits or licenses that cross indigenous lands.375
IV. CONCLUSION
The international treaties analyzed in this Article show how
international law recognizes a State’s sovereign right to extract its
natural resources for the benefit of its citizens. States have “absolute”
authority to determine the most effective and efficient way to develop
and build infrastructure to extract natural resources in their territories.
369 TC Energy Press Release, TC Energy disappointed with Expected Executive Action
revoking Keystone XL Presidential Permit, (Jan 20, 2021), https://www.tcenergy.com/
announcements/2021-01-20-tc-energy-disappointed-with-expected-executive-actionrevoking-keystone-xl-presidential-permit (last visited Mar 5, 2021).
370 Kyla Tienhaara, Keystone XL Legal Risks Highlight Dangers of Putting Investors
Before Climate Change, CONVERSATION (Jan. 26, 2021), http://theconversation.com/
keystone-xl-legal-risks-highlight-dangers-of-putting-investors-before-climate-change153814 (last visited Mar 5, 2021).
371 USMCA, supra note 184, at Annex 14-C.
372 Id. at Annex 14-C.3. (“A Party’s consent under paragraph 1 shall expire three years
after the termination of NAFTA 1994.”).
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Supra Section II.D.
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These treaties subtextually conceive of resources as tools for
development. In the case of energy projects, it is necessary to drill wells
to extract oil and gas, and to construct pipelines to transport them, to
secure the flow of energy products to achieve long-term “development.”
In the name of undefined development, the State can infringe on the
property rights of individuals, companies, and/or communities. The
remedy left to the affected parties under international law is to receive
monetary compensation for the infringement upon their rights.
International law, as such, recognizes both a liberal and utilitarian
conception of property rights that fails to incorporate other social
values not connected to the resources’ economic potential.376 This
liberal and utilitarian version of property rights obscures the fact that
some property rights conflict with social values not shared by the
majority of the population, particularly indigenous people.377 The
conflict with these other noneconomic values is not resolved by granting
land titles to the communities and forcing them to defend their property
rights against third-party interference. The international system places
the interests of the State to develop the resources above those of the
indigenous community and grants the affected tribes remedies that
monetize the value of their property.
The consequences of these liberal and utilitarian conceptions of
property rights in international law are even clearer when the clash
between the State and the communities also involves foreign investors
extracting resources on behalf of the States. When foreign energy
companies are added into the equation, international treaties provide
them with remedies that are more attuned with their shareholder
values. The investment regimes grant foreign investors multimilliondollar damages compensations when the State fails to protect them.
When the communities and the foreign investors’ interests collide, the
regime leaves governments in an intractable position to decide who to
compensate, the communities or the investors. The decision becomes a
cost-benefit analysis that compares the value of the investment against
the value of tribal-ancestral land. One is quantifiable by nature, the
other is not.
The international instruments that protect indigenous rights are
insufficient to fully tame the liberal and utilitarian conceptions behind
the sovereign rights of the State to extract natural resources. The
international laws that protect indigenous rights, including the IACtHR’s
case law, reinforce the idea that communities have the right to a
376

Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 7.
For example, the right of the store owner to exclude and the rights of members of
the public to enter public accommodations and to engage in contractual relationships.
377
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consultation that accounts for their particularities, such as language and
cultural accommodations and attempts to aid the communities’
understanding of an investment’s consequences. They emphasize the
fact that the indigenous communities have a right to receive title to their
property, and so it must be protected by the State. This Article, however,
moved the debate to the perspective of the State facing challenges from
both investors and indigenous rights. Instead of focusing on the best
practices for conducting a prior and informed consultation process with
indigenous communities, it invited the reader to see the conflict that
emerges when government officials must decide who to protect when a
conflict occurs between communities and investors. The cases
presented here show how the indigenous-rights regime collides with
the investment regime in the execution of energy-related projects when
they are executed and not in their planning stages. This Article argued
that, notwithstanding the advancements in international indigenous
rights, the regime does not fully tame the State’s sovereign rights to
extract natural resources for the benefits of energy projects.
Even assuming that the pre-extraction consultation process
respects the principles established by international law, the remedy is
to compensate monetarily for the loss. When international courts like
the IACtHR find violations of the right of consultation, the remedy is
usually to compensate the communities, along with other public
remedies such as public declarations, monuments, and creations of
programs to protect their culture. But the pipeline ultimately gets
constructed, the drills perforate tribal land, and roads are built around
the energy infrastructure. The regime allows the State to monetize the
indigenous communities’ interests and compensate them when the
resources located in their lands are affected by energy projects. Even if
it mitigates the exercise of sovereignty, the indigenous-rights regime
also recognizes the State’s right to exploit their lands for a “public
benefit.”378 The clash with foreign investors emerges when the State
acts through private parties, a key characteristic of energy-related
projects, to develop the natural resources.379 The concessions,
contracts, and licenses are protected investments in international
bilateral treaties. As such, governments receive pressure to protect
those investments against community unrest.

378 Anaya & Puig, supra note 20, at 437. Even Anaya and Puig recognize that the “duty
entails more than a mere right to be informed and heard but less than the right to veto.”
Id.
379 See generally THE CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES: A LEGAL CULTURE ANALYSIS (Tina
Soliman Hunter et al., eds., 2020).
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By exposing how energy projects on indigenous lands create a
clash of rights, this Article sets the stage for future research. The Article
invites the reader to redefine property in a way that addresses the
interests of all the parties involved and the social, cultural, and spiritual
relationships that natural resources create with different parties. The
redefinition of property rights over mineral and energy resources
should address contemporary needs like community concerns,
sustainable production of energy, and the protection of companies’
long-term financial interests. Perhaps we could borrow ideas from the
existing literature on energy justice to address these goals and avoid a
clash of interests among all the parties involved.380 Energy justice
advocates for the inclusion of communities in the decision-making
process, share the benefits of sustainable production, and include their
spiritual and cultural values in the way projects are designed.381
Energy-justice advocates argue that energy production should be
democratized and foster social relations.382 As a new paradigm guiding
the planning of energy projects, energy justice aims to ensure that
decisions are made in a democratic and socially inclusive manner.383
The process is not binary like the right of consultation but rather a
course of action that requires continuous engagement.384 How do we
involve communities in the benefits of energy transition?385 How can
they participate in the process of deliberation to balance different
sources of energy production? These are all questions that need to be
addressed as part of the process, and which go beyond the current
proposals to codify further the right of consultation, expand the use of
social corporate responsibility principles, or include amicus briefs in
investment arbitral proceedings.
Energy transition through the lens of energy justice offers
communities an opportunity to own and control clean energy resources
while reducing localized environmental and health impacts associated
380

Energy justice exists as a discursive phenomenon that spans the social science and
legal literatures. The most frequently referenced framework consists of the following
tenets: distributive, procedural, and recognition justice. These together create the
concept of energy justice.
381 See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy
Justice in Indigenous Communities, 56 NAT. RES. J. 369 (2016); Kristen van de Biezenbos,
The Rebirth of Social Licence, 14 MCGILL J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 149 (2018); Shelley Welton
& Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
307 (2019); Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581
(2018).
382 Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 381, at 581.
383 Id.
384 See van de Biezenbos, supra note 381, at 167–78.
385 Baker, supra note 381.
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with burning fossil fuels.386 This transition is an opportunity for
governments and companies to implement equity-centered energy
policies.387
It further offers an opportunity to reshape the
socioeconomic relationships created by energy choices.388 As opposed
to a clash of rights being litigated in separate international tribunals, we
can start thinking about different ways in which property rights over
energy sources create social relationships and opportunities to produce
renewable energy in a socially distributive way. Moreover, we can begin
a conversation about ways in which the State can democratize the
decision-making process for energy projects, as opposed to relying
exclusively on economic considerations.389
Finally, as this Article explained, we should also abandon false
narratives regarding the ways in which communities benefit from
economic development that results from international trade and
investment agreements.390 If we continue to emphasize the monetary
benefit of energy production over any other social value, as the current
treaties do, communities will be affected and, in many cases, will never
see the benefits that they are being promised. If there is one thing that
we have learned from NAFTA, it is that international trade agreements
are not the magic formula that ends poverty, migrations, and
underdevelopment. The Zapatista indigenous rebellion in Chiapas,
Mexico—which began the same day that NAFTA came into effect—
warned us of this fact, and we ignored it. Twenty years later, the same
underdeveloped regions of Mexico—Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas,
Tabasco—are coincidently home to most of the nation’s indigenous
communities, who still face high levels of poverty and exclusion. They
have not seen the trickle-down benefits of the trade and investment
agreements. Yet, this time, the USMCA and Mexican energy reform are
bringing foreign investment to their doorsteps.391

386

Welton & Eisen, supra note 381, at 330–42.
See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewable Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903
(2011).
388 See Welton & Eisen, supra note 381.
389 See Hernandez Crespo G., supra note 31. As argued by Hernandez Crespo,
mediation might help us abandon the trenches and expand the field in which parties can
engage in a dialogue towards energy sustainability and social justice.
390 Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to
Facilitate Adjustment, INT’L MONETARY FUND (April 10, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/04/08/making-trade-an-engine-of-growthfor-all.
391 Baker, supra note 381.
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